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ABSTRACT 
TO THINE OWN SELF BE TRUE: A PHENOMENOLOGICAL INVESTIGATION 
 
INTO THE ROLE OF SELF IN A MORAL DILEMMA 
 
 
Patricia McCarthy Broderick 
Center for Counseling and Family Studies 
Liberty University, Lynchburg, Virginia 
Doctor of Philosophy in Counseling 
 
Moral identity was investigated phenomenologically as it was experienced both by those 
who adhered to their stated moral convictions as well as those who did not. More 
specifically, 16 adult, unmarried, pro-life women who had experienced an unwanted 
pregnancy were interviewed, 8 of whom had carried and 8 had aborted. Significant 
findings include the propensity of those who carried and aborted, alike, to view their 
moral dilemmas through the filter of protection of self. Those who carried saw their 
moral beliefs as serving their self-interests, but those who aborted did not. Connection 
with a higher purpose was found in those who carried. A Moral Juncture Model of Self, 
as conceptualized by the researcher, is presented. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Albert Bandura (2002) once asserted, “Almost everyone is virtuous at the abstract 
level” (p.115); however, what is done in real life is often another matter entirely (Blasi, 
1980). What one hypothetically considers the right thing to do in a moral dilemma is 
often radically different from what one actually does when personally faced with that 
exact moral dilemma (Krebs & Denton, 2005). Despite intensely held moral beliefs, the 
movement from the impersonal “one ought” to the very personal “I should” is often quite 
pronounced (Goodman, 2000). This gap between what one believes is the right thing to 
do in a situation and what one actually does when faced with that situation remains 
perplexing. 
Why are some people who have very strong moral beliefs unable to live by them 
while others are able to uphold their moral convictions despite the promise of substantial 
personal sacrifice? Questions such as these have been pondered for centuries. For 
example, Paul, a first century apostle of the early church, reflected on his personal 
torment: “For I have the desire to do what is good, but I cannot carry it out. For what I do 
is not the good I want to do; no, the evil I do not want to do – this I keep on doing” (Rom. 
7:18-19, The Holy Bible, New International Version). 
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 Background to the Problem 
Researchers have spent decades investigating the countless factors that determine 
how people make moral decisions (Bandura, 1999; Bergman, 2002; Bersoff, 1999b; 
Blasi, 1980; Colby & Damon, 1992; Denton & Krebs, 1990; Gilligan, 1977; Haidt, 2001; 
Hoffman, 2000; Kohlberg, 1971; Milgram, 1974/2004; Oliner & Oliner, 1988; Piaget, 
1932/1969; Sykes & Matza, 1957). Piaget (1932/1969) conducted in situ observations of 
children in the midst of unstructured play. Then through Kohlberg’s (1971) work, moral 
development researchers took a radical move toward analysis of hypothetical dilemmas. 
Only in the last thirty years have researchers begun to study the reasons why hypothetical 
moral decisions frequently vary from the decisions one makes when faced with that same 
dilemma in an authentic, personal situation (Bandura, 2002; Blasi 1980; Krebs & Denton, 
2005). 
Researchers have turned their attention to factors other than merely moral 
reasoning to account for what influences actual moral (or immoral) behavior. Some of the 
other factors found to significantly impact moral action include: (a) moral emotions 
(Hoffman, 2000), (b) moral intuitions (Haidt, 2001), (c) moral motivations (Bersoff, 
1999a), (d) the ability to rationalize (Sykes & Matza, 1957; Bandura, 1999; Tsang, 2002), 
and (e) moral self-identity (Blasi, 1984). 
Researchers have also focused their study on actual moral behavior by conducting 
qualitative studies of societal moral exemplars in comparison with a control group of 
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people with no exemplary standing in society (Colby & Damon, 1992; Hart & Fegley 
1995; Matsuba & Walker, 2005; McAdams, Diamond, de St. Aubin, & Mansfield, 1997; 
Oliner & Oliner, 1988; Verplanken & Holland, 2002; Walker & Pitts, 1998). 
Additionally, social psychologists have examined criminals and delinquents who defy the 
moral standards set by society through laws (Straub, 2003). However, scant research 
exists that identifies the factors that contribute to the failure to uphold one’s own moral 
standards (Bandura, 1999, 2002; Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara & Pastorelli, 1996). As 
Joy (1983) aptly asserts, “Moral failure, too, belongs to the domain” of moral 
development research, necessitating that the researchers delve into why one would revert 
to “self-centeredness, and destructive, anti-just, immoral reasoning and behaving” (p. 58). 
The challenge for the researcher is to find a real-world venue for the study of a self-
described moral failure as it compares with those in a similar situation who have upheld 
their own moral beliefs.      
The dilemma of an unwanted pregnancy has long been understood to generate 
some of the most intense and weighty moral internal conflict in a woman’s world 
(Coleman, Reardon, Strahan, & Cougle, 2005; Gilligan, 1977). Many researchers have 
used unwanted pregnancies where abortion is legally sanctioned by the state as a 
laboratory for studying moral decision-making (Foster & Sprinthall, 1992; Gilligan, 
1982). Several studies indicated that those who hold negative attitudes about abortion 
will have increased post-abortive psychological complications (Adler et al., 1990; 
Conklin & O'Connor, 1995) as well as spiritual repercussions from their abortions 
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(Trybulski, 2005). Recent polls show more than half of Americans label themselves as 
pro-life (Ertelt, 2004). Therefore, an exploration into the moral decisions of pro-life 
women in unwanted pregnancies is a culturally significant setting for studying factors 
that influence moral decision making. 
 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the moral self-identity as it was 
experienced both by those who adhered to their own stated moral convictions as well as 
those who did not. More specifically, the study targeted select pro-life women who had 
experienced an unwanted pregnancy and explored how their perceptions of their own 
moral self-identities influenced their decisions whether to carry their pregnancies to term. 
The nature of this type of investigation, which sought to explore the significance of 
morality to one’s self-identity within the experience of an actual moral dilemma, was best 
examined using a phenomenological method of inquiry (Blasi, 2005; Blasi & Glodis, 
1990, Kohlberg & Candee, 1984). 
 
Research Questions 
In this study, it was assumed that women who self-identify as being pro-life (to be 
defined below) but chose to abort an unwanted pregnancy have made a decision that 
violates their moral beliefs. Concomitantly, it was assumed that women who self-identify 
as being pro-life and choose to carry their unwanted pregnancy to term have made a 
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decision congruent with their moral convictions. Given these assumptions and taking into 
account that the overarching objective of this study was to examine the extent to which 
moral self-identities influenced the translation of moral beliefs into moral actions, the 
following primary research questions framed this investigation: 
1. How do select pro-life women describe their moral self-identities prior to an 
unwanted pregnancy? 
2. How do participants describe the impact of that pregnancy on their moral self-
identities? 
3. What, if any, factors of their moral self-identity do participants identify as 
influencing their decision to abort or to carry? 
 
Definitions 
Akrasia 
The term akrasia was used in this study to refer to the inability to act in 
accordance with one’s own sense of moral obligation or a failure to act with moral 
integrity (Bergman, 2002). Akrasia was assumed in this study when pro-life women 
chose abortion. 
 
Morality 
Morality is a code of conduct which defines right and wrong as accepted by a 
society, a religion, or an individual for her own behavior (Gert, 2008). Morality in this 
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study was operationally self-defined by the participants to eliminate the researcher’s bias 
and to facilitate the study of actions either morally congruent or morally incongruent with 
the participant’s own moral judgments. Therefore a moral decision, in this study, is one 
that is congruent with the participant’s own moral judgment and an immoral decision is 
defined as one that is not consistent with the participant’s own moral judgment. 
 
Moral Agency 
Moral agency can be exercised in both an inhibitive and a proactive manner. 
Inhibitive refers to the perceived ability to refrain from immoral behavior and proactive 
describes the self-assessment of one’s capability to behave morally (Bandura, 1999). This 
study considered both aspects of moral agency expressed as the perceived capability to 
reject abortion as well as the capacity to carry to term. 
Moral Identity   
Using Blasi’s (1983) “Self Model of Moral Functioning,” moral identity was 
defined in this study as the extent to which morality is reflected as a central or essential 
characteristic of an individual’s sense of self. Because of this, the terms “moral identity,” 
“moral self,” “moral self-perception” and the more accurate term, “moral self-identity” 
were used interchangeably. 
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Moral Integration 
Moral integration occurs, according to Blasi (1983) when moral judgment unites 
with moral action and results in personal consistency. Moral integration was assumed in 
this study when pro-life women chose to carry their unwanted pregnancies to term. 
Pro-life 
The question of what constitutes the definition of “pro-life” is debatable even in 
pro-life circles. However, the accuracy of the definition was not of grave concern for the 
purposes of this study. What was significant was an accurate understanding of whether 
the participants in this study had violated or upheld their moral convictions. The 
parameters used in this study to define the term, “pro-life” began with Werner’s (1993) 
“Principled Pro-life” definition. Werner defined members of this principled pro-life 
category as those who (a) describe the fetus as a person who is alive; (b) think abortion is 
therefore the taking of a life; and (c) reject the benefits of abortion to the individual or 
family, regardless of circumstance. Thorp and Wells (1995) recognized that most pro-life 
physicians consider abortion justifiable if it preserves the life of the mother. Additionally, 
Christian tradition has held that abortion to save a pregnant woman’s life is justifiable 
(Jones, 2005). Consequently, this study classified those women who considered abortion 
justifiable only if the continuation of a pregnancy threatened the physical life of the 
mother as “pro-life”.   
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Unwanted Pregnancy 
For the purposes of this study, a woman who aborted her pregnancy and who was 
not coerced to do so was assumed to have experienced an unwanted pregnancy (Adler et 
al., 1992). A pregnancy carried to term was defined as “unwanted” if, at the point of 
discovery, the mother (a) was unmarried and (b) claimed she did not want to be pregnant. 
   
Locating Myself as a Researcher 
In order to elevate the level of authenticity and trustworthiness in a qualitative 
study, Creswell (1998) recommends that the researcher make possible sources of 
preconception explicit by exposing “past experiences, biases, prejudices and other 
orientations that have likely shaped the interpretation and approach to the study” (p. 202). 
Certainly, my past and present experiences, beliefs, and passions deeply impacted my 
interest in and consequently my choice of focus in this study. Therefore, in the spirit of 
transparency, I will briefly discuss these areas of myself as they pertain to the research 
topic. 
I was raised in the home of a military officer where morality was constantly 
emphasized. My selection of the United States Air Force Academy as my college of 
choice speaks to my own comfort in living in an environment where honor and integrity 
were highly treasured and enforced. In my first year as a cadet, I also became a follower 
of Christ. This faith emphasizes the powerful moral code of honoring others above self as 
was done by Jesus Christ for all humanity.   
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My experience as a student at the Academy gave me my first exposure to 
abortion. I heard that female cadets who became pregnant were quietly escorted 
downtown for abortions because pregnancy and parenthood were grounds for dismissal 
from the service academies. Although I have never experienced an abortion, I understood 
how sexual incidents that occurred while at the Academy could have forced me into an 
unwanted pregnancy. This would have required me to choose between aborting so I could 
graduate or the more difficult path of becoming an unwed mother. Without a strong belief 
structure about abortion, I am unsure what I would have chosen at that time. 
The revelation that I could have chosen abortion compelled me to get involved 
with helping women faced with crisis pregnancies to find ways to give their children life. 
My Christian convictions, bolstered by education about fetal development, abortion 
procedures, and the negative emotional and spiritual impact abortion can have on women 
have led me to become pro-life. I was a volunteer counselor at pro-life pregnancy centers 
for seven years and have financially supported them for the past twenty years. 
Despite my Christian convictions, I recognize that, at times, I fail morally. Even if 
I believe strongly that something is the right thing to do, I can allow fear, self-
centeredness, and pride to override my own moral convictions. Consequently, I have a 
keen interest in the field of moral development and specifically, the difficulty one has in 
actually doing that which one has decided is morally right. An exploration of my own 
moral failures has resulted in an understanding that my own movement to self-
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centeredness is very natural, resulting in a daily struggle. Although I know the right thing 
to do, I often fail to do it. 
In essence then, this study is an extension of the study I have begun on myself. 
Why do I undertake what is right when it is hard, but other times neglect carrying out 
what is right even if it is an easy task? My hope was that in hearing the voices of those 
who have betrayed themselves as I have at times, I would more readily recognize and 
reject that propensity in myself. Likewise, I hoped that in listening to the voices of those 
who have risen above their self-protective selves, I could do so myself. 
Because of my deep involvement in the pro-life community, I understand gaps 
often exist between what the pro-life community espouses and what they do when 
personally faced with an unwanted pregnancy (Henshaw & Kost, 1996). Due to my 
deeply held beliefs that abortion is harmful to both child and mother, I attempted to set 
aside my judgment of what constitutes moral and immoral actions. By reporting the 
experiences of women who were self-proclaimed pro-life prior to an unwanted 
pregnancy, this becomes their pronouncement, rather than mine. 
 
Significance of the Study 
Although mankind makes moral decisions every day, Rest (1986) points out that 
“moral behavior is an exceedingly complex phenomenon” (p. 18). The field of 
psychology has used a variety of research settings in an attempt  to gain understanding of 
this multifaceted subject. Delinquency, or the violation of social norms has been used to 
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study moral failure (e.g. Straub, 2003). Those chosen as social moral exemplars have 
been investigated (e.g. Colby & Damon, 1992) and, in some cases, compared to those 
who are not known for exemplary moral behavior (e.g. Hart & Fegley, 1995). In-depth 
comparisons have been made between those viewed as morally courageous (e.g., rescuers 
of Jews in Nazi Germany) and those who did not demonstrate such courage in the same 
situation (Oliner & Oliner, 1988). However, little in-depth qualitative work has been 
done to investigate the decisions of those who have violated personal moral values 
compared to those who upheld theirs. This study was designed to help fill that gap.  
  The concept of moral identity has been hypothesized as an important bridge 
between moral judgment and moral behavior (Blasi, 1984). Scant qualitative research has 
been conducted to phenomenologically explore whether moral identity is the pivot point 
(Goodman 2000) it has been theorized to be (Hardy & Carlo, 2005). To do this 
adequately, a real-world venue for the study of the moral self as experienced by someone 
who displayed moral integrity was needed to compare with those of someone self-
described as having failed morally. 
The dilemma of an unwanted pregnancy in an environment where abortion is both 
legal and available provides an appropriate setting to study intense personal moral 
deliberations. However, in much of the literature, even when women assert they believe 
abortion is wrong, the rightness or wrongness of the decision has often been ignored 
(Blasi, 2004). The women in Gilligan’s study said things such as “I don’t believe in 
abortions” (Gilligan 1982, p. 81); “It is taking a life” (p. 83) and “I have always thought 
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abortion was a fancy word for murder” (p. 85). These women’s judgment of the 
immorality of abortion was seemingly ignored by the researchers who treated all 
decisions of a moral nature as “moral.” The design of this investigation accounted for the 
women’s beliefs about the immorality of abortion by making that conviction the lens 
through which their actions were viewed as adhering to moral convictions or 
contradicting them. This study attempts to investigate, phenomenologically, the position 
that moral self-identity holds in actual moral dilemmas. 
 
Summary 
Often a gap exists between what one believes is the right thing to do in a situation 
and what one actually does. While qualitative studies usually have focused on violations 
of society’s moral standards (Oliner & Oliner, 1988), little research has been conducted 
to explore the experience of violating one’s own moral convictions or the experience of 
adhering to those convictions in a similar situation. It has been proposed that one is more 
likely to adhere to one’s moral convictions when one considers morality to be central to 
self-identity (Blasi, 1983). This study of pro-life women who have experienced an 
unwanted pregnancy provided fertile ground for the exploration of moral identity as it 
influenced the capacity to hold to her stated moral convictions. The review of the 
literature to follow frames the discourse, past and present, of theories and research 
concerning the connection between moral reasoning and moral action.  
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CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Overview 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the existing literature in order to present 
the theoretical discourse and applicable research pertaining to the relationship between 
moral judgments and moral actions. In the literature, the relationship between moral 
judgment and action has been a topic of myriad research and theorizing (Bandura 1999; 
Blasi, 1980, 1983, 1984, 1993, 2004, 2005; Bergman, 2002; Bersoff, 1999a, 1999b: 
Colby, 2002; Hardy & Carlo, 2005; Kohlberg & Candee, 1984; Nunner-Winkler, 1993; 
Rest, 1984; Walker, 2004). The cognitive-developmental movement, which brought 
moral psychology into a field of its own and centered mostly on the realm of moral 
reasoning or judgment, will open the discussion. Beyond the moral reasoning alone 
approach, the review will follow the research as it made a practical move toward 
theorizing and investigating the variables in the exposed gap between moral judgment 
and action. The next section addresses the concepts and research of moral emotions and 
intuition and how they inform the moral judgment–action gap. Then the research into 
moral motivations and its subset, moral identity, will be presented, including the gaps in 
the moral identity research. Finally, an overview of how the moral dilemma of an 
unwanted pregnancy in a woman’s life has been used previously in the literature will be 
discussed. 
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Moral Reasoning 
While playing games such as marbles with children and recording their 
spontaneous remarks, Piaget (1932/1969) uncovered what he described as phases that, 
“broadly speaking, follow one another without, however, constituting definite stages” ( p. 
195). Through a series of naturalistic observations, Piaget recognized even young 
children as philosophers who answered moral questions in ways very different from 
adults. In young concrete-thinking children, morality was framed as an obedient response 
to adults. However, older children, he noticed, had begun to internalize the consciousness 
of good in an autonomous and reciprocal manner, initiating and expecting the give-and-
take of moral norms in relationships independently. This type of development later gave 
way to the “discipline of inner submission which is the mark of adult morality” (Piaget, 
1932/1969, p. 404). 
According to Piaget’s (1932/1969) formulation, children’s moral development is 
best promoted through discussion among equals (cooperation) rather than constraint from 
an authority (heteronomy). In the forward to his book on childhood moral development, 
Piaget began with the disclaimer that it is the “moral judgment that we propose to 
investigate, not moral behavior or sentimentality” (1932/1969, p.7). Through the 
experience of cooperation, Piaget expected moral thought to develop from moral action. 
Therefore, since he did not expect moral thought to precede moral action, he never 
concerned himself with the dilemma of akrasia (Bergman, 2002). He wrote, “Thought 
always lags behind action and cooperation has to be practiced for a very long time before 
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its consequences can be brought fully to light by reflective thought” (Piaget, 1932/1969, 
p. 64). In Piaget’s formulation, since moral thought developed from moral action, the 
dilemma of akrasia was never addressed (Bergman, 2002). 
Building on Piaget’s notion of the child as a philosopher, Kohlberg (1981) 
conducted cross-cultural, longitudinal studies on children’s moral reasoning. In so doing, 
he found what he called “universal levels of development in moral thought” (Kohlberg, 
1981, p. 17) that he claimed could be defined independently of specific content. People 
moved invariantly, in sequence, up the three levels and six stages, as described briefly 
below (taken from Kohlberg, 1981): 
1. Level I – Pre-conventional – Morality based on cultural rules and labels 
a) Stage 1 – Punishment and Obedience Orientation 
b) Stage 2 – The Instrumental Relativist Orientation 
2. Level II – Conventional – Internalized Cultural Expectations 
a) Stage 3 – The Interpersonal Concordance or “Good Boy-Nice Girl” Orientation 
b) Stage 4 – Society Maintaining Orientation 
3. Level III – Post-Conventional or Principled – Based on universal values and 
principles apart from authority 
a) Stage 5 – The Social Contract Orientation 
b) Stage 6 – Universal Ethical Principles Orientation – Following self-chosen ethical 
principles such as justice, human rights and respect for human dignity  
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Moved by his proximity to the Holocaust and unwilling to kowtow to the value-
neutral voice of social science, Kohlberg asserted that a philosophical underpinning must 
be present to any talk of “moral” development (Walsh, 2000). Kohlberg (1971) argued 
that his research revealed “justice” had proven to be the over-arching principle toward 
which people morally develop, albeit at different paces and with different end-points. 
Kohlberg’s method of evaluating the moral stages using hypothetical dilemmas generated 
a series of research challenges. Although ample support for Kohlberg’s cognitive-
developmental perspective existed (Blasi, 1980), troubling exceptions to his model 
persisted as well. 
Researchers demonstrated that moral judgment varies with the content of the 
dilemma presented to or generated by participants in their studies (Krebs & Denton, 
2005; Krebs, Vermeulen, Carpendale, & Denton, 1991; Walker, de Vries, & Trevethan, 
1987). The research of Carpendale and Krebs (1992, 1995) also showed that the audience 
of the reasoning affected the way one thought about moral issues. Similarly, work by 
Denton and Krebs (1990) revealed that moral reasoning changed with the context of the 
dilemma. Additionally, people often reasoned at higher Kohlbergian stages about abstract 
moral dilemmas than they did about self-reported personal real-life dilemmas (Armon, 
1995, 1998; Krebs & Denton, 2005). Each of these findings questioned Kohlberg’s 
emphasis on the ability to reason at higher stages as the lone goal of moral development.  
While Kohlberg is credited with making moral development its own field of 
psychology, his original formulations apparently dismissed the question of whether this 
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higher staged ability to structure moral cognitions in a universal, reciprocal manner 
would lead to moral action. Kohlberg (1981) referenced the Platonic assumption that “He 
who knows the good chooses the good” (p. 30). This assumption eventually displaced 
Kohlberg’s theory from center stage of the moral psychology field to a supporting role, 
but not without first igniting a firestorm of research. 
The turning point in the direction of the moral development field seems to have 
been ushered in by Blasi (1980). In his review of the literature, Blasi compared 
Kohlberg’s stages of moral development with a variety of measures of real-life moral 
actions including reported delinquency, descriptions of honesty, measures of conforming 
activities, and altruistic behaviors. While concluding that moral reasoning is statistically 
related to moral action, Blasi (1980) contended that the research does not support the 
theory that those who reason at the higher Kohlbergian stages are more likely to uphold 
their own reasoned moral standards. This problem of akrasia or the inability to act in 
accordance with one’s own sense of moral obligation showed up in a variety of other 
studies, challenging the central importance Kohlberg’s theory gives to moral reasoning 
(Bergman, 2002). 
Milgram’s (1974/2004) now-famous and equally controversial investigation 
brought akrasia into the limelight. Milgram’s experiment included actors pretending to be 
both test-takers and authorities administering the tests. The subjects of his experiment 
were asked by the authority figures to shock test takers for wrong answers with feigned 
volts of electricity. Although the majority of his subjects clearly saw disobedience of the 
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authority figure by terminating the shocks as the morally right thing to do, very few 
exhibited the courage to stop delivering the shocks (Milgram, 1974/2004). 
Oliner and Oliner’s (1988) work further highlighted the problem of akrasia. They 
compared those who rescued Jews from the Holocaust with those who had opportunity to, 
but did not get involved. Although they were not studying moral reasoning per se, Oliner 
and Oliner (1988) found that only 11% of rescuers were motivated to action by their 
reasoned principles. 
Gilligan’s (1982) interviews of 29 women facing the abortion dilemma further 
substantiated the presence of akrasia in actual moral reasoning. Although not directly 
addressed by Gilligan, her anecdotal transcripts document a gap between these women’s 
theoretical moral reasoning about the morality of abortion and their behavior. Gilligan’s 
(1982) interviewees used phrases such as “I am saying that abortion is morally wrong, 
but the situation is right, and I am going to do it” (p. 86), and “I have always thought 
abortion was a fancy word for murder….but I am doing it because I have to” (p. 85). 
These quotes point to a marked disconnect between these women’s reasoning about the 
morality of abortion versus their actions in an unwanted pregnancy. 
Foster and Sprinthall (1992) found a similar gap between reasoning ability and 
actual reasoning in a moral dilemma. They queried young women, ages 12 to 25, who 
had come to a health care facility to abort their pregnancies. Foster and Sprinthall (1992) 
found that regardless of age, the women reasoned at a lower Kohlbergian stage when 
 18
determining what to do about their own abortions than they reasoned on the hypothetical 
dilemmas.  
 Colby and Damon’s (1992) research furthered the understanding of the moral 
reasoning-action disconnect. In their study, 23 moral exemplars were picked by a panel 
of “expert nominators” for possessing all the characteristics of a highly moral person 
(committed to morality, possessing moral integrity, selfless, inspirational, and humble). 
In testing Kohlberg’s moral stages of these exemplars who were known to live 
exceptionally moral lives, Colby and Damon (1992) discovered that only half of them 
reasoned at the higher stages (four to five) while the other half reasoned at stages three 
and four. This lent further credence to the notion that one does not need to reason at high 
levels to act morally. 
 More recently, studies with adolescents have shown a similar gap between 
reasoning and action. Hart and Fegley (1995) found 15 adolescent “care exemplars” who 
participated in helping behaviors in the community exhibited no higher levels of moral 
judgment than those in a control group of adolescents who were not known for their 
participation with helping behaviors. Conversely, in their exploration of 278 adolescents, 
Leenders and Brugman (2005) found that scores of those who obtained low Kohlbergian 
measures of moral judgment were not predictive of reported delinquent behavior. 
Many researchers still claim that moral reasoning is a necessary component of 
moral action (Blasi, 1999; Bergman, 2002; Hoffman, 2000; Rest, Narvarez, Bebeau, & 
Thoma, 1999). Other researchers, however, have begun developing more comprehensive 
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theories involving other elements that moderate the relationship between moral reasoning 
and behavior. Moral character had long been abandoned by the field of psychology 
because of the confusion and uncertainty surrounding a theoretical basis for the concept, 
as well as the propensity to reduce moral character to nothing more than a bag of 
disputable virtues (Blasi 2005). The concept of moral character has recently been 
revitalized in a project by Lapsley and Power (2005); however, the differentiation of 
moral character from moral identity in this project remains conceptually vague (Blasi, 
2005). The most well-researched and conceptually clear moderators between moral 
reasoning and moral action appear to be moral emotions (Hoffman, 2000), moral intuition 
(Haidt, 2001), moral motivation (Power, 2005), and moral identity (Blasi, 1983, 1984, 
1993, 1995, 2004).  
 
Moral Emotions  
Although Kohlberg’s work was guided by the assumption of cognitivism, he 
recognized human affect plays an important role in moral reasoning as well (Kohlberg & 
Candee, 1984). He contended that emotions, such as sympathy, indignation, concern and 
guilt needed the structure of objective cognitive perspective-taking operations to be a 
positive addition to one’s moral development. Indeed, the studies that Batson and his 
colleagues (Batson, Klein, Highberger, & Shaw, 1995) at the University of Kansas 
conducted on their students seem to support Kohlberg’s assertion. They found empathy-
induced altruism that has a goal of helping the one to whom empathy is felt can be 
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independent of the moral principles of justice. Specifically, when their students felt 
empathy for a particular individual, they were willing to over-ride their own beliefs of 
what constitutes fairness and allocate preferential help for that individual. 
Colby and Damon’s (1992) study recognized the importance of empathy to the 
moral exemplars that they interviewed. Oliner and Oliner (1988) likewise noticed more 
empathy in those who risked personal safety to rescue the Jews from the Nazis than the 
non-rescuers. Although both studies were correlational, empathy seems to be related to 
moral behaviors. Similarly, Kagan (1997) found that some individuals have 
temperaments which naturally produce more frequent and intense moral emotions. What 
remains unknown is how much of the tendency toward moral emotions is attributable to 
temperament and how much is learned.   
Blasi (1999) took a detailed look at the role of emotions in moral motivation. His 
contention was that if emotions are motivators of behavior and if the regulation of 
emotion is largely shaped by individual automatic mechanisms or classical conditioning, 
then they can be trusted as a sincere, objective expression of the attitudes of the person. 
According to Blasi, even though emotions occur involuntarily, they are similar to 
intentional actions, in that they reveal one’s desires and beliefs about a situation. 
Additionally, Blasi asserted that emotions can be shaped reflexively as they are 
experienced and consequently owned as appropriate or rejected as inappropriate to one’s 
perception of oneself. For Blasi, emotions such as empathy are not moral unless they are 
regulated intentionally toward specifically moral ends, or if they are a spontaneous 
 21
response to pre-existing moral concerns. In Blasi’s formulation, it is prudent for the 
researcher to inquire about the emotions surrounding an event as an objective indication 
of that individual’s “personal norms” (Blasi, 1999, p. 15).                
In her review of the literature concerning the role of emotions and emotion-related 
regulation in moral functioning, Eisenberg (2000) agreed with Blasi’s (1999) theories 
about moral emotions. Her review suggested that moral emotion can motivate both moral 
and immoral behaviors. Additionally, those emotions can serve to communicate one’s 
moral values and concerns to the self and others. Eisenberg (2000) identified guilt as the 
quintessential moral emotion, but discussed shame and empathy as being other well-
researched emotions. In addition, Eisenberg’s review found non-moral emotions such as 
anger, frustration, fear, and general temporary mood can impact moral functioning. 
Hoffman (2000) also worked with moral emotions to formulate a theory of 
empathy and guilt development. In light of his study of prosocial moral behavior, he 
recognized the importance of these emotions to moral development. However, he also 
recognized the limitations of moral emotions to guide moral behavior and has labeled 
those he found in his research as “empathic over-arousal,” “familiarity bias” and “here-
and-now” bias. Empathic over-arousal can cause one to become so distressed that the 
person moves out of empathic mode entirely. Familiarity bias occurs when a person 
empathizes with family, friends and others similar to oneself more than those who are 
different. A here and now bias occurs when a person favors people in close proximity 
who present themselves as victims. 
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Because moral emotions can lead to both immoral and moral behavior, Hoffman 
(2000) contended, much like Kohlberg (1971), that a comprehensive theory of moral 
development requires moral principles. According to Hoffman, empathy is “mutually 
supportive” (p. 225) with the principle of caring and provides a motive to remedy 
violations to the principle of justice. However, Hoffman also conceded that empathy and 
guilt may well be the response of those motivated to uphold the principles of justice and 
care. Hoffman’s extensive work with moral emotions pointed to the controversial nature 
of the role that human affect plays in promoting moral action. 
Moral Intuition 
Closely related to the research concerning moral emotions is Haidt’s (2001) social 
intuitionist approach to moral judgment. Moral intuition is defined by Haidt as: “The 
sudden appearance in consciousness of a moral judgment, including an affective valence 
(good-bad, like-dislike), without any conscious awareness of having gone through steps 
of searching, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion” (p. 818). Moral reasoning is, 
in the moral intuitionist’s paradigm, relegated to searching for an argument to support a 
decision that has already been made. Haidt likens the intuitionist’s reasoning to the 
arguments of a lawyer defending a client rather than a scientist seeking truth. Therefore, 
according to Haidt, emotions such as love, empathy, guilt and remorse, as well as 
intuitions, provide a much greater influence on moral behaviors than objective thoughts 
about the matter. 
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The moral intuitionist’s theory is supported by the research of Bargh and 
Chartrand (1999). They covertly primed their participants with mental representations. 
This unconscious priming had the same effect on the subjects’ behavior as explicit and 
intentional directions. Whether self-intended or placed there by others, the source of the 
representations was inconsequential. Bargh and Chartrand (1999) concluded that most 
mental processes are automatic, effortless, fast, and are either naturally formed or have 
developed out of repeated and consistent experience. 
Haidt’s (2001) assertions in his social intuitionist theory opened a floodgate of 
criticisms. Saltzstein and Kasachkoff (2004) argued that although behaviors may be 
undertaken automatically, this does not necessarily indicate that they “originated and 
developed automatically” (p. 279). They contended that Haidt confuses the causes given 
to explain behavior, with reasons given to justify the judgment as being morally correct. 
Despite these concerns about the intuitionist theory, many have begun to recognize the 
non-verbal and intuitive aspect of moral decision-making in moral judgments (Narvaez & 
Bock, 2002; Colby, 2002). Like moral emotions, Narvaez and Lapsley (2005) assert that 
moral intuitions can be trained, educated or developed similar to the ways experts train 
themselves to have automatic responses based upon important clues. Moral intuitions and 
emotions, according to Saltzstein and Kasachkoff (2004), can be a reflection of an 
iterative, developmental process combining reasoning, experiences and intuitions, 
providing an objective insight into one’s moral motivations. 
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 Moral Motivation 
A situation where one knows the moral thing to do but lacks the motivation to 
follow through with it, is easy to conceive (Hardy & Carlo, 2005). The concept of moral 
motivation attempts to answer the question posed by the existence of akrasia, “Why is 
one unable to act according to one’s own sense of moral obligation?” Power (2005) 
defined moral motivation simply “as a part of a desire for the good” (p.197), but later 
qualified his definition by requiring that moral motivation be “based on a recognition that 
one is acting in accord with one’s moral duty or sense of what is morally right” (p. 203). 
Nunner-Winkler (1993) further clarified the motivation toward morality by 
defining it as a second-order desire. According to Nunner-Winkler, first-order desires are 
immediate or spontaneous needs or wishes, such as a desire for sweets. Second-order 
desires are those that are chosen with some deliberation, often regulating first order 
desires, such as a desire to eat in a healthy manner. Nunner-Winkler (1993) contends that 
the motivation to act morally or to be a person of high moral character constitutes a 
second order desire. For a motivation to be moral it must be aligned with one’s sense of 
moral duty or what is right. However other motivations, such as empathy, can prompt one 
to act. According to Nunner-Winkler, moral duty acts “as a filter through which other 
motives must pass” (p. 284). 
Along with this internal obligation arising from the individual’s conscience, 
Power (2005) recognizes a sense of duty that spawns from identification with the 
community. Expanding on Kohlberg’s “just-community” approach, Power contends that 
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along with experiencing accountability for community norm violations, individuals 
experience “collective responsibility” (p. 220). These are motivations that develop out of 
a sense of attachment to the community as a whole. 
Identification with one’s community is not the only influence that researchers 
have found can increase one’s sense of moral motivation. Hoffman (2000) points to 
empathy and guilt as emotions that consistently act as motivators to moral behavior. 
Hardy and Carlo (2005) agree with Hoffman that moral emotion can be a primary source 
of moral motivation and often is the “‘spark’ that leads to action” (p. 233). Hardy and 
Carlo contend, however, that Hoffman overstates the role of moral emotion. They can 
conceive of a situation where one believes a course of action is right, is emotionally 
motivated to take that course of action, but does otherwise. This lends credence to the 
presence of other moderating factors in addition to moral reasoning and emotion. 
Bandura (1999, 2001) posited that one’s sense of moral agency could provide a 
motivation to do what one believes is morally right. According to Bandura (1999), moral 
agency has dual aspects – inhibitive and proactive - where inhibitive refers to one’s 
perceived ability to refrain from immoral behavior and proactive describes the self-
assessment of one’s capability to behave morally. Power (2005) asserts that spirituality 
can contribute to one’s sense of agency by creating a “perception of a supramoral self 
that draws its sense of moral agency from a power beyond the self” (p. 237). 
Additionally, Power claims that spirituality can motivate moral action by changing the 
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way individuals perceive themselves and their world, as well as by adding religiously 
motivated weight to their moral reasoning. 
Krebs and Denton (2005) took a much more cynical approach to religion as the 
basis of moral motivation: 
All societies attempt to persuade people that behaving morally will pay off in the 
end, because, for example, there will be a final reckoning that will determine 
whether they reside eternally in heaven or in hell. However, false promises tend to 
lose their power when they are exposed as invalid. (p. 646) 
Building on Piaget’s (1932/1969) idea of cooperation as the ideal moral motivation, 
Krebs and Denton suggest that people can be motivated to act cooperatively rather than 
immorally when they believe that they will reap greater benefits by doing so. Although 
openly dismissive of religion’s contribution to moral motivation, Krebs and Denton’s 
(2005) pragmatic approach to morality realistically recognizes that there are competing 
motivations to the desire to be moral. 
Competing Motivations 
Colby (2002) recognized that common sense, more than research, teaches that 
regardless of one’s level of sophisticated moral reasoning, one can be motivated toward 
desires other than morality. Walker (2002) supports Colby’s assertion with his definition 
of moral motivation as the prioritizing of “moral values over competing values and 
concerns” (p. 355). Hoffman (2000) contended that moral acts cannot be read as simple 
expressions of one’s moral motives. Rather, actions are the result of one’s attempts to 
balance egoistic and moral motivations. According to Bargh and Chartrand (1999), one’s 
judgments, decisions, and behavior are accurately viewed as indicators of the goals one is 
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presently pursuing. These may or may not be moral goals and are often subconscious. 
This is in keeping with Freud’s (1930/1961) “pleasure principle” which recognized that 
man is motivated, often subconsciously, to seek pleasure and to avoid pain. 
The avoidance of pain can be a powerful motivating factor. Straub (2005), whose 
work had him examining the psychological origin of mass murders, genocide, and other 
forms of immoral human destruction, recognized the propensity toward hostility and 
aggression was often motivated by the frustration of one’s basic psychological needs. 
Likewise, he asserts that fulfillment of these needs (for security, positive identity, 
effectiveness, control, relationships, autonomy, comprehension of reality, satisfaction, 
and transcendence of the self) provides fertile ground for growth of altruistic behaviors. 
In a similar vein, Sykes and Matza (1957), found in their work with delinquents, that 
“deviation from certain norms may occur not because the norms are rejected, but because 
other norms, held to be more pressing or involving a higher loyalty, are accorded 
precedence” (p. 669). 
In his review of research studying subjects motivated to act morally, but unable to 
do so, Bersoff (1999b) hypothesizes that when other life goals outweigh one’s desire to 
be moral, self-serving interests succeed in controlling behavior. According to Bersoff, all 
that needs to be done is to convince oneself that one is the exception to the rule in order 
to justify fulfilling self-interests. Krebs and Denton (2005) asserted, “Selfishness and 
self-serving biases may well be a more formidable enemy of morality than low-stage 
moral reasoning” (p. 646). 
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Batson and his colleagues at the University of Kansas have gone one step further 
by claiming from their research that rather than being motivated to be moral, most people 
are motivated to appear moral while serving self-interests (Batson, Kobrynowicz, 
Dinnerstein, Kampf, & Wilson, 1997; Batson, Thompson, Seuferling, Whitney, & 
Strongman, 1999; Batson, Thompson, & Chen, 2002). Through a series of eight studies, 
Batson and colleagues continually found more evidence of what they termed, “moral 
hypocrisy” than participants demonstrating moral integrity. They concluded that when 
being moral involves personal cost, a person’s motivation to be truly moral is often over-
powered by one’s motivation to serve self-interests. Batson et al. (2002) also noted that 
the charades undertaken by participants to appear moral to themselves were extensive. 
Consequently, appearing moral was important even when they knew they were being 
immoral. This finding supports Tsang’s (2002) assertion that the rationalizations of 
immoral behavior, ironically, are driven by the high importance one places on moral 
standards and the need to appear moral to oneself. The self-condemnation associated with 
acting immorally leads one to reinterpret the act as moral by using rationalizations or 
neutralizations. 
Neutralizations 
Much has been written about the mental gymnastics involved in making immoral 
behavior palatable to oneself. Although often used interchangeably in the literature, 
neutralizations are considered to be the thoughts used to justify an immoral act that one is 
planning to commit without seeming immoral to the self (Sykes & Matza, 1957); on the 
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other hand, rationalizations are the cognitive processes one goes through after the 
violation of a moral standard to convince oneself that the action was not immoral (Tsang, 
2002). Ground-breaking neutralization theory work developed largely within the context 
of delinquency research by Sykes and Matza (1957), helped explain many types of norm-
contradicting behavior (Fritsche, 2002). The five major neutralization techniques their 
research identified were: (a) denying responsibility such as asserting that the action was 
accidental or outside one’s control; (b) denying injury, such as believing that no great 
harm was caused; (c) denying the victim, by asserting that the injury was not wrong in 
light of the circumstances or that no one suffered; (d) condemning the condemners, by 
rejecting or minimizing those who disapprove of the behavior; and (e) appealing to 
higher loyalties, by claiming there is someone who demands greater loyalty than the 
society who formed the norms. 
Bersoff (1999a) studied neutralization techniques among participants who were 
purposefully overpaid. He found that it took only subtle disruptors to derail the 
neutralization process used to justify accepting overpayment. Additionally, he noted that 
the less ambiguous the situation, the harder it was for participants to justify the unethical 
behavior. Bersoff (1999a) further concluded from his study that when one uses 
neutralizations to further one’s self-interests, those neutralizations will be effective only 
as far as they are believable to the self. 
Bandura (2002) proposed a theory of moral disengagement, whereby people who 
feel motivated to violate their own moral standards, disengage their normal self-
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sanctions. He described cognitive manipulations which allow one to justify immoral 
behavior as: (a) euphemistic labeling to provide a language that sanitizes cruel behavior; 
(b) advantageous comparisons of the self to others who are more morally corrupt; (c) 
displacement of responsibility, minimizing one’s agency and responsibility; (d) diffusion 
of responsibility leading to collective action and anonymity; (e) disregard or distortion of 
consequences; and (f) the dehumanization of the victim. Bandura contends that these 
methods of disengagement are used to neutralize self-censure and to preserve self-esteem. 
 Bandura (2002) described the differences between individuals who maintain their 
own moral standards and those who are unable to keep such moral integrity. He asserted 
that the differences are not found in the ability to reason morally at the abstract level, but 
how easily one can use these disengagement techniques quickly and effectively in real 
life. Whether one refers to neutralization techniques, rationalizations, or disengagement 
techniques, it seems evident that an internal drive to maintain a positive moral self-
perception exists. Recognition that the self is central to the ability to live by one’s own 
moral standards has produced a spate of research regarding moral identity. Since moral 
motivations ultimately stem from the perceptions and priorities of the self, for the 
purposes of this study, the focus was on moral self-identity.  
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Moral Identity 
Early Moral Identity Research 
The concept of moral identity springs, in part, from Festinger’s (1957) Theory of 
Cognitive Dissonance. This theory holds that individuals strive for consistency within 
themselves, between their thoughts and actions. To Festinger, the existence of dissonance 
(or inconsistency) motivates one to reduce that dissonance by avoiding situations or 
information that would increase that inconsistency. Festinger further states that “a fear of 
dissonance would lead to a reluctance to take action – a reluctance to commit oneself. 
Where decision and action cannot be indefinitely delayed, the taking of action may be 
accompanied by a cognitive negation of the action” (p. 31). After a series of studies, 
Festinger concluded that the “tolerance of dissonance” (p. 267) varies from person to 
person. For some, dissonance is extremely painful and intolerable; for others, life 
contains more gray areas, making dissonance easier to tolerate. 
In their comparison of rescuers with those who did not rescue the Jews in Nazi 
Europe, Oliner and Oliner (1988) found that the moral self provided the filter for action 
or inaction. The rescuers in their study were more expansive through strong attachment to 
others, but non-rescuers were more constricted and detached from the Jews and their 
plight. Rescuers’ sense of obligation to help arose largely from internal belief structures 
that valued the lives of others and the anticipation of guilt or shame if one failed to act. 
Rescuers, they found, displayed a strong sense of personal integrity and care within their 
own value systems. 
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Similarly, in their study of moral exemplars, Colby and Damon (1992) found that 
moral excellence required personal integrity or a commitment to consistently translate 
moral principles into moral action, regardless of the personal cost. Colby and Damon 
concluded that exemplars exhibited an inner harmony that seemed to unite self and 
morality, so much so that their decisions to act were almost no decisions at all. The moral 
exemplars perceived that they had no choice but to live by their moral commitments. 
These findings caused Colby and Damon to conclude, “Where there is perceived 
concordance between self and morality, there will follow direct and predictable links 
between judgment and conduct as well as great certainty in the action choices that result” 
(p. 304).  
Blasi’s Self Model of Moral Functioning 
Blasi (1983) was the first to propose that the moral self and particularly, moral 
identity, could fill the akrasia gap between moral judgment and functioning. His 
contention was that “self-consistency is the motivational spring of moral action” (Blasi, 
1993, p.99). Blasi has been systematically honing his “Self Model of Moral Functioning” 
(hereby also known as the “Self Model”) for more than two decades (1983, 1984, 1993, 
1995, 2004). Blasi claimed that self-identity is the central concept in understanding moral 
functioning as it relates moral cognition to moral behavior. The three basic components 
of his model include (a) the importance of moral self, (b) personal responsibility for 
moral action, and (c) self-consistency (Walker, 2004). The first of these three 
components, the moral self, is conceptualized by Blasi as how central people value 
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morality in their awareness of their core selves. The moral self, Blasi contends, speaks to 
the “significance and salience” (Walker, 2004, p. 2) of moral values to the core self-
identity. 
  The second central component of the Self Model is the extent to which one feels 
personally responsible for moral action (Blasi, 1983). For Blasi, the formation of a moral 
judgment is insufficient to move one to act morally unless one also is convicted of a 
moral obligation to undertake (or refrain from) that action. It is this sense of moral 
responsibility that implicates the self as the agent accountable for the moral action. 
The third central component of the Self Model is what Blasi (1983) calls self-
consistency or integrity. Initially, Blasi conceptualized moral integrity as a motivational 
force that prompts the self to act in alignment with one’s own moral judgments. If that 
alignment does not occur, then Blasi contended that neutralization techniques would be 
required to alleviate the inconsistency within oneself. Later, Blasi (2004) clarified that 
there are many motivational forces that propel one to action. Some are personal or non-
moral values rather than moral. However, there are only a few values in one’s sense of 
self that can be classified as core values and these are particularly important to creating 
the essence of a being. For Blasi (2004), to truly be oneself is to live out core ideals. 
According to Blasi (1993), only with these components of the moral self in mind 
can the notion of moral self-betrayal be conceptualized. The thoughts and emotions 
associated with a sense of self-betrayal require that one feel responsible for one’s 
identity. Blasi and Glodis (1990) attempted to measure moral self betrayal in women by 
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asking each of them to identify an ideal that was very important to her sense of self. Then 
six to ten weeks later the women were encouraged to envision themselves taking part in 
activities hand-selected to contradict their previously self-stated ideals. Moral self-
betrayal was evaluated by using the following scales: positive emotion, conflict, strong 
negative emotion, reference to ideal, practical reasons, moral and altruistic reasons, and 
self-inconsistency. 
Blasi and Glodis (1990) found two distinct patterns in the group of women: one 
group seemed content to focus on the pragmatic consequences of the decision, while the 
other group felt deep regret at violating their values. The pragmatic group expressed 
relief and satisfaction in their decision, even though the decision went against their stated 
ideals. The regretful group voiced neither positive feelings nor pragmatic justifications. 
They viewed their assigned deeds as serious contradictions to their ideals, resulting in 
feelings of shame, guilt, and depression. The researchers concluded that expressions of 
self-betrayal were indications that the ideals were more central to the women’s core sense 
of self. 
Recent Moral Identity Research      
Several studies have been conducted to test the validity of the moral identity 
construct and its impact on moral behavior. Hardy and Carlo (2005) conducted a review 
of the literature prior to 2005 and concluded that Blasi’s (1983) conception of moral 
identity as a source of moral motivation was generally validated. The studies which 
focused on adolescents and adults generally supported the notion that those who held 
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moral values and virtues as an important part of their self-concept also were more 
engaged in pro-social behaviors. 
What was not clear to Hardy and Carlo (2005) in their review, is the direction of 
causality between moral identity and moral behavior. In fact, a two-year longitudinal 
study by Pratt, Hunsberger, Pancer, and Alisat (2003) comparing adolescents’ moral 
identity with their involvement with community helping activities indicated that the 
volunteer activities preceded endorsement of moral values for the self, and not the other 
way around. In a similar finding, Matsuba and Walker (2005) solicited stories from 
adolescent moral exemplars, and noted that most narratives included an early exposure 
and involvement with the suffering of others. 
Early exposure to others’ suffering was a theme supported in Colby and Damon’s 
(1992) moral exemplars, as well as Oliner and Oliner’s (1988) study of the rescuers of 
Jews in Nazi Europe. Oliner and Oliner (1988) describe a catalyst as an external event 
that challenged the rescuers they studied, causing them to internalize the needs of others 
and compelling them to become involved. Haste and Locke (1983) refer to a triggering 
event as an occurrence that creates a powerful emotional response which triggers a 
reexamination of one’s life choices, moral perspective, and sense of social responsibility. 
The necessity of some form of activation found in the literature lends credibility to the 
second component of Blasi’s (1983) model of the moral self, that of personal 
responsibility. 
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The responsibility component of Blasi’s Self Model was further bolstered by 
Verplanken and Holland ‘s (2002) research. In a series of six studies looking into the 
value-behavior link, they found two components necessary for values to affect behavior:  
the value must be central to the self and the values had to be cognitively activated in 
order to guide behavior. The value-activation manipulations that Verplanken and Holland  
used only worked when the value was central to the self, lending credibility to the 
importance of the self in the value-behavior relationship. However, having moral values 
as central to the self was not sufficient to motivate congruent behavior without activation 
of those values. A responsibility to uphold those values was needed as well.    
Aquino and Reed (2002) conducted a series of six studies designed to investigate 
the construct of moral identity further. First they designed and validated a measure of 
moral identity that identified nine traits that a moral person possesses: care, compassion, 
fairness, friendliness, generosity, helpfulness, diligence, honesty, and kindness. Then they 
compared those claiming a strong moral self-identity with actual donation behaviors, and 
found second to gender (girls gave 2.33 times more than boys), students who strongly 
internalized moral identity were more likely to donate food to the poor. Additionally, the 
results revealed two dimensions of the self-importance of moral identity, one private 
(internalized) and one public (symbolic). Aquino, Reed, Thau, and Freeman (2007) 
attempted to examine the role that the moral self-concept plays in moral disengagement. 
They found that participants in whom morality occupied an important position in the self-
concept were less likely to use disengagement techniques to support brutality in war. 
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The concept of moral identity as a motivator toward moral behavior has come 
under some scrutiny. Nucci (2004) contends that the idea that a moral action is primarily 
motivated by one’s desire for self-consistency is mechanistic and reductionistic, ignoring 
the complex contextualizations involved in many moral decisions. Nisan’s (2004) 
research agrees with this assessment. In describing the difference between a moral 
judgment and moral choice Nisan (2004) states, 
When a person confronts a situation in which he identifies a moral problem, he 
carries out two judgments – one regarding the right behavior in this situation, 
from a pure moral standpoint relying exclusively on moral standards, and the 
other an all things considered judgment that he will actually adopt (p.148).  
In Nisan’s formulation, the moral choice, rather than the moral judgment is more closely 
linked with identity – it “reflects the person’s identity, values, and commitments that are 
important to him, without which he is not himself” (p. 156). Blasi (2004) responds by 
asserting that it is the hierarchical ordering of these contextual inputs present in every 
moral decision (needs, desires, values, traits, and life events) that determine what one’s 
core commitments are. Therefore, how one orders these inputs reflects the relative 
importance and centrality of morality to the self.  
Limitations to Moral Identity Research 
In their review of the literature, Hardy and Carlo (2005) admit to being puzzled as 
to why there has been extensive theorizing about, but little research directed toward 
moral identity. Perhaps, they surmise, it is due to the abstract and complex nature of 
moral identity. Regardless of the reasons, there are notable limitations to the research 
concerning the moral self. Although the qualitative designs used by Oliner and Oliner 
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(1988) as well as the interviews of moral exemplars by Colby and Damon (1992) 
identified moral identity as a recurring theme in their research, these research projects 
were limited to the study of individuals who were moral exemplars or failures in the eyes 
of someone other than themselves. 
Batson and colleagues (1997, 1999, 2002), conducted quantitative studies to 
expose moral hypocrisy and found that participants violated their own moral standards. 
However, in-depth experiential interviews of participants who have violated their own 
self-identified, strongly held moral beliefs, have yet to be conducted. Additionally, in 
their review of the research directed at understanding moral identity, Hardy and Carlo 
(2005) note that little has been done to study moral identity in morally prohibitive 
situations where inaction rather than action is the morally ideal action.  
 
Abortion as a Moral Decision 
 Bandura (2002) recognized that the study of morality using abstract principles in 
“decontextualized and depersonalized circumstances” (p. 115) renders almost everyone 
as virtuous. However, the choices one makes in real world decisions are much more 
indicative of one’s moral fabric. Abortion has long been recognized as a contentious 
public moral topic, as well as a hotbed of intense personal moral deliberation. 
Gilligan (1977) has described all judgments about the moral dilemma of an 
unwanted pregnancy as part of the moral domain. Specifically, she recognized that, 
“When a woman considers whether to continue or abort a pregnancy, she contemplates a 
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decision that affects both self and others and engages directly the critical issue of hurting” 
(Gilligan, 1977, p. 491). In her book developed from her research, Gilligan quotes 
naturalistic interviews of women in the throes of the abortion decision in an attempt to 
lend credence to her theory that women’s moral reasoning is constructed of “caring” or 
relational themes that are overlooked in Kohlberg’s “justice” framework of moral 
development. In her analysis of the voices of women making the decision whether or not 
to abort, however, she seemingly overlooked the moral judgments of the women 
themselves. Many of the women began their discussions of the conflicts and reasoning 
behind their decisions to abort with their own moral pre-judgments about abortion such 
as “I don’t believe in abortions” (Gilligan 1982, p. 81); “It is taking a life” (p. 83); and “I 
have always thought abortion was a fancy word for murder” (p. 85), then went on to 
describe why they had the abortion anyway. 
When Broen, Mou, Bodtker and Ekeberg (2005) looked at the reasons Norwegian 
women chose to abort, their findings supported many previous studies that identified 
educational, vocational and financial concerns, as well as the lack of desire to have a 
child, to be among the top reasons for abortions. As Nunner-Winkler (1994) notes, the 
question these women are answering is not whether an abortion in their situation is 
morally justifiable or not, but what kind of lifestyle they want to live. According to 
Nunner-Winkler, this involves, “a morally neutral balancing out of different ego 
interests” (p. 269) such as the desire for a professional career versus a desire to have 
children and stay home. 
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In her interviews of women considering abortion, Smetana (1982) recognized 
these differing frameworks that women use to make their abortion decisions. She 
distinguished between three types of reasoning: moral, social-conventional, and personal. 
She discovered that the type of reasoning a woman uses depends upon her belief as to 
whether or not the fetus is a human life. If the woman thought the fetus was a human life, 
the decision became moral for her. Research concerning adjustment following abortions 
shows that the framework a woman uses in her choice to abort matters.   
 Women who have negative attitudes toward or are ambivalent about abortion will 
experience greater negative psychological adjustment responses, including guilt, anxiety, 
and depression (Adler et al., 1990, 1992; Cohan, Dunkl-Schetter, & Lydon, 1993; 
Coleman, Reardon, Strahan, & Cougle, 2005). Coleman et al.’s (2005) summary of 
longitudinal pre-and post-abortion studies found that although initial emotions may 
resemble relief, negative emotions including dissatisfaction with the abortion decision 
increase over time. This is especially evident, they noted, when the woman was 
conflicted over the meaning of abortion, felt ambivalent about the pregnancy, or 
experienced a bond with the fetus.  
 
Summary 
 The moral development field has undergone radical transformation over the last 
thirty years. It has evolved from thinking about hypothetical dilemmas to considering 
actual experienced moral dilemmas. It has matured from the notion that the ability to 
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make principled moral judgments precipitates moral action to a recognition that moral 
reasoning is but a small factor in the complex totality of factors that contribute to moral 
deeds and misdeeds. It has displaced cognition from the spot of preeminence in moral 
functioning and opened itself up to the complex role that intuitions, emotions, and 
motivations play in driving behavior. Moreover, it has begun to recognize the essential 
role that the ever-present variable of the self has as the primary filter, processor, and 
executor of morality. However, limited research exists that investigates this phenomenon 
of the moral self as it is actually experienced by those who have upheld their own moral 
standards in contrast to those that have not. In keeping with the movement in the field, 
this study investigated, in-depth, the complexity of moral self-identity through the 
experiences of pro-life women who lived the moral conundrum of an unwanted 
pregnancy. 
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODS 
In light of the movement of the field of moral development, this study explored 
the moral self as it was experienced by those who adhered to their own stated moral 
convictions in comparison with those who did not. To accomplish this, the moral self-
identities of select pro-life women who experienced an unwanted pregnancy were 
explored to consider the influence that identity had on those women’s decisions whether 
or not to carry the pregnancy to term. A phenomenological method of inquiry was 
utilized in order to tap into the richness of the participants’ self-identities as perceived 
within the experience of an actual moral dilemma (Blasi, 2005). 
This study was designed to add to the body of literature by utilizing in-depth, 
semi-structured interviews with 16 self-identified pro-life women who have experienced 
an unwanted pregnancy, 8 of whom terminated the pregnancy, and 8 of whom carried the 
unwanted pregnancy to term. This chapter will describe (a) the choice of the qualitative 
approach and the phenomenon of unwanted pregnancy in the study of moral identity; (b) 
the selection of participants and the methods of negotiating access to them; (c) the 
commitment to confidentiality and how that was communicated; (d) the interview guide 
and procedures implemented for its use; (e) the emotional impact on the participants and 
how their care was insured; (f) the procedures for data management, analysis and 
verification; and (g) the approach to ethical concerns of the study. 
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Research Design 
Although the literature concerning moral identity and its influence on the moral 
thought-action link has been inundated with philosophizing and theorizing, thoughtful 
research into moral identity remains somewhat lacking (Hardy & Carlo 2005). The 
previous chapter identified both qualitative and quantitative studies that researched moral 
identity. Both methods have contributed to the present understanding of how moral 
identity bridges the gap between moral reasoning and moral action. Although Batson and 
colleagues (1997, 1999, 2002) conducted quantitative studies that included participants 
who violated their own moral standards, no qualitative studies comparing the moral 
identities of participants who have or have not violated their own self-identified, strongly 
held moral beliefs have been completed.  
Many researchers recognize that the study of moral reasoning and moral behavior 
is, by its very nature, phenomenological (Kohlberg, 1981; Blasi, 1983; Higgins-
D'Alessandro & Power, 2005). Others, however, disagree on grounds that moral 
functioning is intrinsically affective (Hoffman 2000); that moral functioning relies 
heavily on intuition (Haidt 2001; Narvaez & Lapsley, 2005; Walker, 2004); that action 
choices are often not made through moral reasoning and deliberation (Nisan, 2004); and 
that attempts to describe why one acted a certain way are usually retroactive (Haidt 
2001), distorted and inaccurate (Bargh. & Chartrand, 1999). Despite these possible 
limitations to a phenomenological approach, the method has considerably more strengths.   
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Saltzstein and Kasachkoff (2004) argue that the mere fact a moral decision is 
made automatically or is triggered by emotion is not proof that the decision originated 
that way. Blasi (1983, 1995, 1999, 2004) has consistently argued that the essence of 
morality necessitates understanding. He is even bolder when he says, “Morally positive 
behavior is that behavior that corresponds to the agent’s moral judgment and is 
performed because the agent understands it to be morally good” (Blasi, 1983, p. 185). He 
takes this stance based on the uniqueness of moral action. Without the understanding that 
an action is morally right, the completion of that deed is morally neutral. Similarly, if one 
does what one knows to be right for the wrong reasons, the action is not morally positive. 
A phenomenological study is best able to “hear” the moral significance of the lived 
experience of each participant in a study (Creswell, 1998; van Manen, 1990). 
Similarly, Blasi (1993) defines identity in subjective experiential terms. As such, 
both the way that one experiences identity, as well as the content around which an 
identity has been constructed, need to be considered (Blasi, 1993). In this paradigm, the 
researcher studies moral identity, but also probes for the sense of agency felt in its 
selection, including the sense of responsibility and fragility toward the identity. Listening 
for these “voices” necessitates phenomenological research. Despite the benefits of 
studying moral identity phenomenologically, very little of this type of research has been 
conducted.   
Kohlberg, Levine, and Hewer (1984) recognized the need to research the 
connection between moral thought and action. In so doing, they considered it imperative 
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that moral conduct be phenomenologically as well as behaviorally measured. An action 
that is immoral to the researcher or to society may not be seen as such by those 
participating in the study (Nucci, 2004). With these considerations in mind, a 
phenomenological approach was used to gather interviews with multiple individuals who 
experienced the moral dilemma of what to do about an unwanted pregnancy in order to 
glean much-needed insight into the impact moral identity may have had upon the 
decision. The participants were able to provide in-depth descriptions of their experiences 
in their moral dilemmas (Creswell, 1998).  
The research into the lives of women who were faced with a moral dilemma about 
which they had previously made definitive abstract judgments was indeed fertile soil for 
the study of moral self-identity. The use of self-described pro-life women in an unwanted 
pregnancy situation was intended to insure the women held their own opinions of what is 
morally right and wrong in this circumstance. This allowed moral self-identity to be 
studied both through the lens of those who adhered to their own moral convictions and 
the lens of those whose actions contradicted their moral beliefs 
  In order to form an adequate comparison for the group of women who chose 
abortion, Adler et al. (1990) recommended that a group of women who surrender their 
child for adoption would be ideal. Although this comparison would ensure the 
unwantedness of the pregnancy, it seemed unnecessarily limiting. Women who have 
moral convictions about abortion would be excluded from the study if they also have 
strong moral convictions that they must live with the consequences of their own behavior 
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and raise the child their actions have produced. Therefore, determining the unwantedness 
of the pregnancy was sought by using probing questions about the initial thoughts and 
feelings upon confirmation of pregnancy. These probing questions were among the initial 
questions of the interview and determined if the interviewee was to be included in the 
study (See Appendix A). 
Coleman et al. (2005) suggested that an adequate comparison group for those who 
chose abortions would be those who wanted an abortion, but who did not obtain one for 
personal reasons such as fear, anxiety, or guilt. This idea, too, was rejected for this study 
because of its limiting nature. A great deal of rich, valuable information about moral 
identity might be needlessly discarded if a study of pro-life women excluded those in an 
unwanted pregnancy who never allowed themselves to consider abortion. Coleman et al. 
(2005) lamented the very few direct comparison studies of women who abort and women 
who carry an unwanted pregnancy to term. This study was designed to have the 
advantage of direct comparison of the experiences of those who aborted and those who 
carried. 
In light of the extensive body of research on morality that preceded this inquiry, 
and to extend the research concerning the role that moral identity plays in the moral 
judgment-to-action link, the following research questions framed the inquiry: 
1. How do select pro-life women describe their moral self-identities prior to an 
unwanted pregnancy? 
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2. How do participants describe the impact of that pregnancy on their moral self-
identities? 
3. What, if any, factors of their moral self-identity do participants identify as influencing 
their decision to abort or to carry? 
 
Selection of Participants 
Because an unwanted pregnancy is such a private, emotionally-charged event in a 
woman’s life, special attention was given to sensitively and discretely gaining access to 
pro-life women who have experienced the phenomenon (Goodrum & Keys, 2007). Due 
to the sensitive nature and hard-to-reach population necessary for inclusion in the study, 
outcropping was chosen as an appropriate sampling technique (Lee, 1993). Outcropping 
involves finding sites where the target group members can be found. Because the target 
population was pro-life women who have experienced an unwanted pregnancy, 
pregnancy centers were an obvious location for finding potential participants. Pro-life 
pregnancy resource centers offer volunteer counseling to women in unplanned 
pregnancies, as well as post-abortion counseling for women who are struggling with their 
abortion decision. 
Due to this researcher’s previous affiliations with pregnancy resource centers, 
access to centers in Colorado and Virginia was attempted first. Once access to the 
facilities was granted, criterion sampling was used to screen the potential participants to 
determine who had experienced the desired phenomenon. Since the number of women 
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needed for the study was not sufficient using these venues, snowball sampling of other 
pregnancy center sites, maternity homes, and other pro-life agencies was then made 
through church and school affiliations. 
In-depth interviews were conducted with 16 self-identified pro-life women who 
experienced an unwanted pregnancy, 8 of whom terminated the pregnancy and 8 of 
whom carried the unwanted pregnancy to term. This number was selected as a means of 
attaining proper saturation, as well as to prevent undue repetition in the collected data 
(Creswell, 1998). Screening questions were asked first to insure the women met the 
parameters for the phenomenon. In order to decrease the risk of selecting participants 
who were merely parroting their parents’ beliefs, only self-described pro-life adults who 
had been independent of parental financial dependence for at least two years prior to the 
pregnancy were included in the study. Relationships other than parents which might 
influence an adult are assumed to have been optional and therefore reflective of the 
values of the adult. Since moral identity is not believed to be formed until late 
adolescence or early adulthood (Blasi, 1993), the experience of an unplanned pregnancy 
at the age of 20 years old was set as a minimum age for the participants.   
As stated previously, this study included only those women who described their 
pro-life position prior to their unwanted pregnancies according to Werner’s (1993) 
principled pro-life definition. This means prior to pregnancy, the participants must have 
(a) viewed the fetus as a person who is alive, (b) considered abortion as the taking of a 
life, and (c) rejected as invalid the reasons for abortion. Although Werner (1993) did not 
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include the caveat, those women who thought abortion was justified if the physical life of 
the mother is threatened by the continued pregnancy were also considered pro-life and 
qualified for the study. The screening process prior to the interviews probed these areas 
of the participants’ stance on abortion. 
  The screening process prior to each interview was designed to take into account 
the above parameters by limiting participation in this study to those who met the 
following criteria:  
1. Must have been at least 20 years old at the discovery of the pregnancy 
2. Must have been financially independent from parents for at least 2 years 
3. Must have been pro-life prior to the pregnancy: 
(a) Viewed the fetus as a person who is alive 
(b) Considered abortion as the taking of a life 
(c) Considered abortion justifiable only if the actual physical life of the 
mother is threatened by the continued pregnancy 
4. Must have had an unwanted pregnancy: 
(a) The pregnancy was aborted but not for the purpose of saving the life of the 
mother, or 
(b) The woman was single and the pregnancy was self-described as 
“unwanted” 
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Data Collection 
In order to collect personal insights into the moral identities of women who have 
experienced the phenomenon of an unwanted pregnancy, one-on-one, in-depth, semi-
structured interviews were conducted and recorded. A long interview protocol of one and 
one-half to two hours (as suggested by Creswell, 1998) was followed to allow the 
interviewer time to establish rapport before reaching the more sensitive, personal 
questions toward the end of the interview (Goodrum & Keys, 2007). This helped elicit 
the deep and rich text surrounding the phenomenon (van Manen, 1990). Verification and 
triangulation of the information gathered in the interviews was garnered by requesting 
journals or diaries that the women had written during or following the unwanted 
pregnancy. Contact was also made with several of the women following the interview to 
clarify points from the interview. Additional verification was sought by performing 
member checks or taking data, and their analysis and interpretation, back to the 
interviewed women to judge the credibility of the findings (Creswell, 1998). 
Due to the sensitive nature of the topics which were discussed in the intensive 
interviews, careful attention was paid to reassure participants of the voluntary nature of 
the interview and the confidentiality. Each interviewee was given a copy of the Informed 
Consent for Participation in a Research Study (Appendix B). After the researcher 
verbally highlighted the key points, requested that the form be read in its entirety, and 
addressed any questions or concerns about the study, the participant and researcher 
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signed two consent forms each. Once researcher and participant each had a copy of the 
signed consent form, the interview began.  
Phenomenological inquiry calls for a guided conversation between the researcher 
and the informant that stays as close to the lived experience as possible (van Manen, 
1990). Thus the setting ought to be a place of comfort and lack distraction (Creswell, 
1998). Face-to-face semi-structured interviews were conducted and recorded at the 
pregnancy centers, where possible. When that was not possible or practical, a site that 
was comfortable and convenient was selected by the interviewee. One interview was 
conducted in a small café; ten were done either at churches or local pregnancy centers, 
three were done in private homes, and two were done in work offices. The semi-
structured interviews followed the Interview Guide found in Appendix A, varying as the 
conversation warranted, but with a focus toward remaining on the specific prompts which 
were guided by the research questions (van Manen, 1990). 
The interview protocol began with screening prompts to ensure the participant 
met the qualifications for inclusion in the study. At the beginning of two of the 
interviews, it became evident that the woman did not meet the criteria, despite having 
been given clear selection requirements. One was clearly not pro-life and the other was 
not pro-life prior to her abortion. Abbreviated versions of the interview were conducted 
to exhibit appreciation for their willingness to participate and to communicate the value 
of their stories, despite their inability to be included in the study. These 2 interviews were 
not included among the 16 that formed the findings. 
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 Following the interview, a referral list of local counselors was provided to each 
participant to give her access to help in handling painful emotions stirred up during the 
interview. In addition to the interviews being recorded, field notes were written after each 
interview. Several brief follow-up interviews were conducted in order to clarify and 
validate information gathered during the first interview. 
Data Analysis 
In qualitative research, Creswell (1998) envisions data analysis as a spiral that 
moves from raw data collection to the final narrative through iterative, overlapping 
interpretative lenses. The gathering, transcribing, coding, and organizing of the data is 
done with the sole purpose of presenting the “essence of the experience” (p.149) through 
meaningful descriptions, interpretations, and classifications. The idea that the data drives 
the management and analysis is the heart of qualitative research. It allows the actual 
experience of those studied, rather than theories about the experience, to formulate the 
overall description of the essence of that phenomenon (van Manen, 1990). Therefore, 
themes for the last two chapters of this study were formulated as they emerged from the 
data through the reading and re-reading of the transcripts, note-taking, and grouping of 
patterns. 
Interviews were transcribed verbatim in their entirety by a transcriptionist so that 
they could be analyzed for emerging patterns. Editing was done by the researcher to 
ensure accuracy. Transcripts were read repeatedly (Creswell, 1998). Then notes were 
made for describing, classifying and interpreting. Each reading was done with the 
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research questions in mind in order to keep the purpose of the study in clear focus (van 
Manen, 1990).  
               
Ethical Considerations 
Qualitative research, by its very nature, brings with it ethical concerns which must 
be addressed by the researcher (Creswell, 1998). These include (a) protection of the 
anonymity of participants, (b) emotional support of participants, and (c) concerns about 
how explicit to be with the topic of the study. The manner in which this study addressed 
each of these concerns will be included in this section. 
Protection of the anonymity of the participants was addressed on multiple levels. 
Pseudonyms were self-selected by each interviewee at the beginning of the interview. 
Only the researcher saw the identifying demographic and contact information as it was 
linked with the pseudonyms of the participants. This information has remained securely 
stored in a locked filing cabinet in the researcher’s home and were destroyed upon 
completion of the study. Only the transcriptionist and the researcher heard the unedited, 
raw data of the recorded interviews, which, at times contained actual names. Once the 
transcriptions were found to be accurate, all names in them were replaced with 
pseudonyms and recordings were erased. 
Due to the sensitive nature of the interviews, protection and welfare of the 
participants remained paramount during the interviews. Therefore, the voluntary nature of 
each interview was emphasized during the review of the informed consent form. 
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Additionally, the interviewees were watched carefully for distress and given the option of 
stopping if they appeared to be struggling emotionally. They were offered the option of a 
15-minute break from the questions or an option to discontinue the interview at any time. 
None of the interviewees took the option to take a break or to discontinue, although 
several were asked, and many experienced distress in the retelling of their stories. 
The nature of the study required that women describe themselves in their 
unwanted pregnancy without being primed with the topic of “moral identity.” Such 
priming would unnecessarily taint the participants’ responses about themselves (Bargh & 
Chartrand, 1999). Therefore, only general rather than specific information about the topic 
of the study was offered on the informed consent form signed by the interviewees 
(Creswell, 1998). The purpose of the study was stated thusly: “to gain insight into the 
actual experiences of pro-life women who have faced an unwanted pregnancy in order to 
understand what factors went into their decisions to abort or to carry the pregnancy to 
term.” Exclusion of a specific focus on moral identity did not increase the risk to the 
participants. 
 
Summary 
Following their review of moral identity literature, Hardy and Carlo (2005) 
recognized the challenges of developing studies that adequately measure the complex and 
dynamic concept of moral self-identity. The use of a phenomenological method of 
inquiry provided a venue for hearing the richness of the participants’ voices as they 
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described their self-identities before, during, and after their actual moral dilemmas (Blasi, 
2005). As such, the moral self-identities of 16 select pro-life women who have 
experienced an unwanted pregnancy was explored using recorded, in-depth interviews to 
investigate the influence that moral identity had on those women’s decisions whether to 
abort or to carry their pregnancies to term. 
Selection of participants was limited to those who were 20 years of age or older, 
who were financially independent, pro-life and who had experienced a self-described 
unwanted pregnancy. In order to allow for comparison, 8 of those participants were 
selected because they chose abortion and 8 because they carried their pregnancies to 
term. The semi-structured interviews, which followed the Interview Protocol, were 
recorded, transcribed by one transcriptionist, and analyzed for themes by one researcher. 
Additionally, journals written by participants about their unwanted pregnancies were 
collected to enhance the trustworthiness of the study. 
The protection of the participants was held in higher regard than the collection of 
data. As such, participants were reassured of their anonymity and their right to withdraw 
from the study at any time in the Informed Consent Form which each interviewee read 
and signed. The participants were offered emotional support through counselor referrals. 
The topic of the study was presented to interviewees generally rather than specifically to 
prevent priming them with the concept of moral identity and thereby tainting their 
insights into their experiences. These methods were all designed to get to the heart of the 
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complex and dynamic concept of moral self-identity as it influences behavior, while 
keeping the best interests of the participants in mind.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS 
The movement from chapter three to chapter four, for the reader, is but the turn of 
a page, but for the researcher, it has been a paradigm-altering journey into the pain and 
peace inherent in the lives of pro-life women whose choices placed them at the moral 
juncture of an unwanted pregnancy. This phenomenological expedition into the 
experiences of 16 women who agreed to share openly what were often the lowest points 
of their lives so that others either would not do likewise, or might find the strength to do 
so, has been nothing short of inspiring. Along the way, the study was focused on how 
these women describe their moral self-identity as it impacted their ability or inability to 
adhere to their own moral convictions. 
This chapter briefly introduces the 16 participants through the means of self-
portraits and then presents the findings organized by the three research questions. Since 
data from the actual experiences of the participants, rather than theories about the 
experience, drives the management and analysis of qualitative research (van Manen, 
1990), the organization of this chapter is also data driven. Thirteen sub-themes arose out 
of the three main research questions and are presented as they were heard: 
1. The participants’ moral self-identities as self-described prior to their unwanted 
pregnancies: 
(a) Moral disillusion and apathy 
(b) Moral clarity 
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(c) Self-focus 
(d) Moral hypocrisy 
2. The participants’ moral self-identities as impacted by unwanted pregnancy: 
(a) Decreased moral agency 
(b) Increased moral responsibility 
(c) The lure of moral hypocrisy 
3. The participants’ moral self-identities as it influenced their decision to carry 
or to abort their pregnancies: 
(a) Protection of self interests through immorality 
(b) Protection of self interests through morality 
(c) Connection with higher purpose 
(d) Disconnection from a higher purpose 
(e) Dissonance emotions 
(f) Inner harmony emotions 
 
Sketches of Participants 
The task of briefly describing 16 complex women, each whose life could easily 
fill a volume, is daunting. Thus, it is important to recognize that these sketches are but 
brief self-portraits of each woman as gleaned from interviews lasting one to two hours. 
Due to no screening for race or ethnicity, all but two of the women were Caucasian. 
Concomitantly, all of the women self-identified with the Christian faith, broadly defined 
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as believers of Jesus Christ. Twelve labeled themselves as non-denominational Christian 
and four as Baptist. Although religion was not included as part of the screening process, 
the pro-life organizations that referred the interviewees are Christian-based. 
With the exception of long-time single mothers Sara and Lisa, who each 
continues to struggle financially, most of the women could be described as middle class. 
All but Jacky, Lisa, Lucy and Sara have attended college. Lisa and Sara have passed the 
General Educational Development (GED) test. This group of women exhibit marked 
variances in their education, their socio-economic status, their support from family-of-
origin, and the availability of free time for the luxury of introspection. Because of these 
differences, it is not surprising that some are more articulate and reflective about their 
experiences than others. However, as Colby and Damon (1992) found in their interviews, 
the will to stand for moral convictions does not necessarily correlate with the ability to 
articulate the moral reasoning behind the judgments. Such was the case with the women 
interviewed for this study. 
Ironically, some of the most moving acts of selfless adherence to morality in these 
interviews came from those least able to describe why they were able to do it. Thus a 
portion of each of the 16 interviews has been included, from the expressive to the 
inarticulate. The brief sketches below will begin with those who chose to abort their 
pregnancies (Alex, Hillary, Jacky, Joan, Lucy, Marie, Sara Kensington, and Sue), 
followed by the women who chose to carry their pregnancies to term (Elizabeth, Joy, 
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Kay, Lisa, Nancy, Samantha, Sara and Yara). Brief demographics of both sets of women 
are outlined in Table 1. 
Women Who Aborted 
Alex is a 20 year old from what she described as a loving southern Christian 
family. She dated the son of her pastor for several years, a young man a few years her 
senior who was her acting youth pastor. They remained virgins for most of their 
relationship until they were alone in her parents’ vacation home. He forced himself on 
her twice, even though she asked him to stop. He denied his part in the pregnancy, but 
was willing to drive her 13 hours to help her get an abortion, if she promised never to 
contact him again. 
Hillary is a Native American, born seventh of a family of eight children, with 
several older sisters who had children out of wedlock. She was married, had one child in 
that relationship, and then divorced. When she was 37 and a single mother of a teenaged 
son, she found herself pregnant again. Her relationship with her boyfriend at the time was 
volatile and unstable. Though raised in a Christian home, she admitted that until recently 
her Christian beliefs never impacted how she lived her life. 
Jacky described being raised in rural Kentucky by a very loving family with lots 
of extended family interaction. Her world fell apart when her father ran off with another 
woman when Jacky was 15. Her mother was unable to function for the next two years, so 
Jacky ran the house. She had been the self-described “good girl” until that time, when she 
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became promiscuous and took up drinking and drugs. She resumed her “fun party life” 
even after she became pregnant and had an abortion at age 22. 
Joan, who picked her pseudo name for “Joan of Arc,” was 41 when she had her 
abortion. She had been married with three children. Her husband ran off when she was 
30, but she could not find him to divorce. While a single mother, she put herself through 
school and became an engineer. She described herself as a “devout Catholic,” but became 
disillusioned with her faith and began an affair with a married man (while still married 
herself). He and his wife paid for the abortion. 
Lucy remembers her father’s death when she was four. She was taken in by her 
grandparents where her grandfather sexually abused her until she was 12. She got 
pregnant at 15 and married at 16 years old. She carried and parented that child despite the 
protests of all around her. She married a second time and was in the process of divorcing 
again when she became pregnant again as the result of an affair at the age of 21. Her son 
was five years old when she chose to abort her second child. 
Marie remembers being sexually abused by a male and female caretaker when she 
was five. Her brother, whom she suspects was abused at the same time, then began 
abusing her as well. Her parents became Christians late in life and were very strict with 
her. During her first year of college she told her mother of her brother’s abuse. Her 
mother denied it could be true. Marie was raped in her early 20s. She began drinking and 
taking drugs which helped her find a profession as a stripper for several years. Her 
abortion was when she was 22-24 years old – she is unable to remember precisely. 
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Sara Kensington1 is the eldest of three in what she described as a dysfunctional, 
but outwardly Charismatic Christian family from Wichita, Kansas. Her father, who was 
an alcoholic, had an affair, and left the family when she was 14. Her mother became 
emotionally and physically incapacitated by his departure. Sara assumed the role of the 
adult, becoming the strong one in the family. Her pregnancy was by her first sexual 
partner, whom she began dating when she was 20, while putting herself through college. 
She was the only one interviewed who used RU 486 for her abortion. 
Sue is third of four children from a Baptist, middle class, Pennsylvania family. 
She is an accountant who was in an abusive relationship at 25 years old when she learned 
she was pregnant. She was preparing to have major back surgery and had subjected 
herself to an estimated 30 full body x-rays before discovering the pregnancy. The doctors 
caring for her never told her what was wrong with the child, but they warned her that the 
pregnancy could not have a “happy ending.” 
Women Who Carried 
Elizabeth is a twin with five older siblings. They grew up in a self-described 
permissive Christian home in Southern Virginia. She reports rebelling around the age of 
13, spiraling into promiscuous sex, drugs and alcohol. She almost finished college on a 
track scholarship, but got injured. She had plans to go into the Marine Corps but a few 
                                                 
1 Sara Kensington came up with this name for herself only after prolonged struggling as to what proper 
“pen name” would be “really good.”  
 63
days before she was to report in, she found out she was pregnant. She and the father, a 
Marine, chose to get married, even though they were not excited about the marriage. 
They are expecting their fifth child now. 
Joy grew up in rural Virginia as the only child of two well-educated Christian 
parents. She is self-described as very bright and opinionated, causing her to have a 
difficult relationship with her parents. She married and divorced an abusive man. Then 
she went to live in a home with eight other “roommates,” one of whom got her pregnant. 
She quickly broke it off when he wanted her to abort the pregnancy. She was 22 at the 
time. She is raising her son. 
Kay was another independent spirit who grew up in rural Virginia in what she 
called a loving Christian family. Her parents each had 13 siblings so she was related to all 
her neighbors. She lost her younger brother in a bicycle accident when she was 16 years 
old. She finished college and went to New Zealand for a month following graduation. She 
was engaged to marry a Navy pilot, but decided while she was away that she wanted to 
postpone the marriage and learn to live on her own first. She became pregnant at 23 upon 
her return to the United States. Her fiancé was transferred to California where he decided 
to end the engagement. She has raised her daughter with her current husband’s help. 
Lisa is an African American from Northern Virginia who presently works as a 
maid. She grew up with a father who was rarely around, and when he was he was 
verbally and emotionally abusive to her. She remembers that she and her sister were 
kidnapped by her father when she was five or six. Her father told her she would never 
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finish school, never get a job and never be able to live on her own. She was pregnant at 
17 and kept her son. She became pregnant again when she was 27. She never married and 
is raising her teenaged daughter. 
Nancy, a 20-year-old, described coming from a supportive, loving Christian home 
in Northern Virginia. She had very strong convictions about waiting until marriage for 
intercourse. She was involved with a man she met at Bible study and found him 
continually pushing the physical boundaries of the relationship they had agreed upon. She 
maintains that there never was penetration, so she was unwilling to believe that she was 
pregnant for some time. The man moved to California and wanted nothing to do with his 
son. She placed her son with a couple in an open adoption. 
Samantha grew up in what she described was a loving Christian home with both 
parents and her grandmother. Her father was in the military and she grew up in several 
states. She was told at 16 she would never have children. When she was 22, her mother 
was killed in a motorcycle accident while her father was driving. She ran from the pain 
by using drugs and partying. She attempted suicide several times and was living with an 
abusive “friend” who got her pregnant just as she was moving out, at age 23. Samantha 
placed her child with a couple in an open adoption. 
Sara grew up in Colorado, the eldest of two girls. She never knew her father in her 
youth, her mother was physically and emotionally abusive, and she was sexually abused 
by a step brother. She ran away from home when she was 14 and lived in and out of 
foster homes until becoming pregnant the first time at 18. The father of her child was a 
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drug abuser, but she tried to make it work with him for her son. Then, at 20, she got 
pregnant again by the same father. At the time of the pregnancy, she was a waitress 
earning less than minimum wage. She has five children now and never married. 
Yara grew up in a Catholic family in rural Philadelphia and went to Catholic 
private schools all through high school. She reports being ostracized socially up through 
her high school years until she discovered that smoking pot made her popular. She admits 
to being an adrenaline junkie who always had a “wild side.” She received her fashion 
degree while living with an abusive boyfriend whom she left just before becoming 
pregnant at age 21. She has raised her son on her own. 
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 Table 1 
Participant Demographics_____________________________________  
Name           At Conceptiona       Age at Outcome of 
__________Prior Pgb__Education Lvl. Age  Interview Pregnancy  
Alex  0 Some College  20  43  Aborted 
Hillary  1 Some College  37  39  Aborted 
Jacky  0 High School  22  46  Aborted 
Joan  3 M.A.   41  56  Aborted 
Lucy  1 High School  21  54  Aborted 
Marie  0 Some College  23  37  Aborted 
Sara K. 0 Some College  20  25  Aborted 
Sue  0 B.A.   25  45  Aborted  
Elizabeth 0 Some College  22  29  Parented 
Joy  0 High School  22  32  Parented 
Kay  0 B.A.   24  43  Parented 
Lisa  1 G.E.D.   27  42  Parented 
Nancy  0 Some College  20  24  Adoption 
Samantha 0 Some College  23  26  Adoption 
Sara  1 G.E.D.   20  30  Parented 
Yara  0 Some College  21  39  Parented  
aAt conception refers to the unwanted pregnancy researched in this study. 
bPrior Pg – Number of pregnancies each woman experienced prior to the unwanted pregnancy explored in this study – 
each prior pregnancy was carried to term and parented. 
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Moral Self-Identities Prior to Unwanted Pregnancies 
Several moral self-identity sub-themes became apparent in the women’s 
descriptions of themselves prior to their pregnancies. All of the women who aborted and 
four of the women who carried described themselves using bleak terms such as: “I was a 
broken person,” “I was lost,” “I was a wreck,” “I was a failure,” “I was a nothing,” “I was 
obviously worthless,” “I was hopeless.” Interestingly, the descriptions from women who 
carried were not as hopeless: “I was a mess,” “I didn’t respect myself,” “I was very 
confused about life,” “I was on a self-destructive path.”  In addition to their low opinions 
of themselves, the following sub-themes arose in the narratives of the women prior to 
their pregnancy and will be addressed: 
1. Moral disillusionment and apathy 
2. Moral clarity 
3. Self focus 
4. Moral hypocrisy 
Moral Disillusion and Apathy 
Four of the women who aborted and one who carried described events prior to 
their pregnancies that led to their discovery that the world is not as they thought it should 
be; subsequently, they became disillusioned with the moral structure they had trusted up 
to that time. Those who experienced moral disillusionment, with the exception of Sara 
Kensington, also described ensuing moral apathy.  
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Marie’s moral disillusionment, for example, seemed to intensify when she finally 
found the courage to tell her mother that her brother had molested her as a child. Her 
Christian mother was unable to believe or hear Marie’s cry for help: 
I grew up in a, you know, a family that we started off going to the Lutheran 
church, and then when I was in about 7th grade, my parents became Christians 
and we started going to a new church, and my dad was very strict, legalistic, and 
had a very tight rein on me, and followed me around, wanted to know where I was 
at all times, and which made it very difficult for me to feel like I could go to them 
with things. So I definitely never told my parents about my brother until later, 
after my first year of college when things started really going downhill for me…I 
came home one break and I told my mom about it, that my brother had abused 
me, and she said, “there’s no way he did that to you.”  So I, that shut me down 
completely, and pretty much at that point was when I really started to go off the 
deep end, and I moved to California. 
Marie’s moral disillusionment caused her to give up her virginity and spiral deeply into a 
lifestyle of moral apathy: 
I was doing some modeling at the time and, you know, really got wrapped up in 
the wrong crowd, and I quit my nanny job and I started dancing. I was a stripper. 
And that was my real way of getting back at men, because they could look but 
they couldn’t touch. And so I did that for about a year and a half, or two years, 
and I would have to get totally drunk or high on drugs to be able to even do it. 
Likewise, Jacky was able to pinpoint the time and cause of her moral 
disillusionment, which led to her own moral apathy: 
I thought we were the good, trustworthy, hard working, great friendships, great 
family. You know, we all, like for holidays we would always go to my 
grandparents’ house, my dad’s parents. All the cousins. We all stayed all night. 
We’d play Candy Land; we’d play card games; we, you know, we’d eat a lot. We, 
you know – it’s all happy memories. All. Until dad left, and until that change. 
Because from that point on, all the relationships were different.   
Everyone, all our relationships were different. And so at the time right before the 
abortion, what I thought, or what I thought was real, or what I thought was right, 
all of a sudden wasn’t anymore. I completely lost the truth of, and perspective, of 
– moral went out, moral went out the door. And then, again, I’m not trying to put 
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all the blame there, but I can tell you that’s when the change of the crumbling 
down of everything as I knew it changed. It was now broken, and then I was very 
angry and pretty much just, you know, screw this. So then started smoking pot, 
starting sleeping around, didn’t care. I just didn’t care. Long answer to a short 
question, I didn’t care. So became very apathetic to morals, and truth, and 
relationships, and holding things sacred. Everything went out the window. 
Joan’s moral disillusionment seemed to have spawned from years of what she 
perceived as unrewarded faithfulness for doing the right thing:  
I couldn’t get that from the Catholic Church. I could get no counseling from the 
Catholic Church. It was, “Go back to your husband,” but I couldn’t find my 
husband, and I was run down. I had spent the past 16 years as a single mom, 
celibate, working myself into the ground, with all three of my children, all 
athletes…So when I went to the flesh, I went to the flesh. There were multiple 
men. I went to the flesh. I can’t even count them on three hands, four hands, 
because I was rebellious, I was hurt, I was confused, I had phobias, I was running 
in fear and didn’t know what I was running from… 
Joan described the moral apathy that followed in this manner: 
I was a nothing. I was – I didn’t really have my family with me because I was 
bad, I was dirty. I was, you know, not acceptable. Not acceptable in that church, 
not acceptable with my family, and I didn’t like who I was, and so I didn’t care. 
And my not caring hurt my children. 
Similarly, Lucy, who had a child at 15, pointed to her life as a single mother and two 
failed marriages as robbing her of a “Leave it to Beaver” idealism that she possessed 
when she was pregnant and able to carry the first time. 
Samantha was the only woman who carried who described this same type of 
moral disillusionment and apathy. It came for her as a result of the death of her mother, 
whom she describes as an “amazing woman”: 
When I was 22, my mom was killed in a motorcycle accident, and my father was 
driving, and so he, we all just kind of went through just a huge just devastating 
time, and at that point I kind of figured I didn’t want to be around anyone or 
anything that reminded me of my mother. It’s not that I didn’t want to remember 
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her. I did remember her. It was just too painful to remember her at that time, so 
that was just kind of my family life surrounding that time… 
 I had stopped going to school. I really just, I dropped out. I didn’t withdraw or 
anything, just stopped going. And everything that I thought I would be able to 
accomplish in my life, I really didn’t care about anymore. Said, you know what, 
whatever, you know, this is obviously not the life that I was meant to have. I’m 
just – maybe later down the road I’ll quit, you know, doing these drugs 
(LAUGHS) and try and get my life back on track, but for right now, I just didn’t 
care. 
In contrast to the moral apathy that is so prominent in many of the stories, some of the 
women maintained a sense of moral clarity prior to their unwanted pregnancy.  
Moral Clarity 
Four of the women who eventually carried their pregnancies to term and one who 
aborted each described having a very strong and clear sense of what is morally right and 
wrong, even if she chose to do wrong. This is referred to as moral clarity.  
Yara described how, despite her partying and wild life prior to her pregnancy, she 
still knew right from wrong: 
I mean, I, you know, while I was going through all this, I still was raised in a 
Catholic family, with two parents. I may not have been very close with my 
parents, but they were a moral people. They taught us right and wrong, you know, 
so I had that instilled within me at some – at some level I knew right from wrong, 
and I just was choosing to be wrong.   
Joy was able to recognize that her inner moral clarity was present despite the 
absence of parental instruction. “I always had very strong – they [my parents] never 
talked to me about smoking, or drugs, or drinking either, but they were very lucky in that 
I just happened to have extremely strong, you know, decisions and stick by them.” 
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Nancy’s moral clarity came in the form of Christian conviction that premarital sex was 
wrong. She attempted to assert these convictions with the young man she was dating: 
When we were dating, he would always initiate physical contact and we would, 
you know, be kissing or whatever, and then it would, you know, all of a sudden 
become into making out, and you know, things got hotter and heavier, and I 
would always—not always, but a lot of times—I’d just be like, “Okay, will you 
stop.” You know, “Stop.” And he would get really frustrated with that, and so that 
was kind of a red flag. And I would talk to him about how I felt about the physical 
relationship, and he was like, “You’re right, you’re right,” and he would say, you 
know, “Cool it,” or whatever, but then it would just happen again. 
Likewise Elizabeth became convicted that her lifestyle of partying was wrong and moved 
back home with her parents in an attempt to manage her temptation. 
One of the women who aborted her pregnancy, Alex, described similar moral 
clarity that stemmed from her Christian faith. She described her physical relationship 
with her youth pastor boyfriend this way: 
And I knew better than it in my head. You know, I – you know all the facts, you 
know better, but it just made sense. I know – I mean, I don’t know how to explain 
that, but it just was kind of like that it made sense, and because I needed the 
security of a man so bad, for whatever reason, I really trusted him, but I had told 
him on the couch that I did not want to do that until we got married. That I had – 
you know, we could do everything else, all these other things, but I did not want 
to have sex, and that angered him, and I remember him getting off the couch and 
just being very angry, and just leaving out the door and slammed the door. 
Alex’s reaction to her capitulation to her boyfriend’s physical pressure to have sex also 
indicates her moral clarity: 
You know, some time that afternoon my sister went with her friends, and I just 
remember going to the bedroom and, you know, making out or whatever, and 
starting into sex, and I remember being on the bottom, and I remember at the 
point of him having intercourse with me, crying and crying and crying, and just 
saying please stop. No, that I can’t do this. Please stop. And I remember that, and 
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I remember him not stopping, that it was not going to be something - he wasn’t 
going to stop.   
Self-Focus   
The results of the interviews indicated that most of the women had motivations 
that trumped morality as a central component to their description of themselves prior to 
their pregnancies. Four of the women who aborted revealed that they were mostly self-
focused. Hillary, for example, described herself this way: 
I don’t know who I was. I really don’t. Like my walk of faith with God was – I 
always depended on myself, and I never depended on Him. Never. Never 
depended on Him. And I just couldn’t see that the choices that I made depended 
on myself, how terrible, how you know, how bad things were. But it’s like I 
always seemed to get through it, and I guess it kind of gave me a warped sense of 
self. You know, a self reliance, thinking that okay, well I made a bad choice, but I 
got through it and, you know, okay, well that’s just how I’ll handle my life. 
Later in the interview, she described her morality prior to her pregnancy as doing that 
which felt right for her, “[I was] again, self reliant, thinking that what I was doing was 
right, and you know, just struggling.” 
Sue describes a similar self-reliant moral structure. Prior to her pregnancy, she 
remembers how she was bent on living as she pleased: 
I was working hard and playing hard, and I kind of had, somewhere along the 
line, come to the conclusion that I could do whatever I wanted, that I didn’t, I was 
a technically good person, and I would just, I was in control of my own life and 
where I was going to go. And I just had pretty much taken God out of the 
equation, and I don’t really remember why. 
Lucy remembers that her life and priorities were very simple and she describes 
them in simple and succinct terms, “I was very lost, and very selfish, self-centered 
person. It was all about me and my son. I think I was like that for a long time.” Similarly, 
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Jacky and Sara Kensington shared their commitment to their own forms of self-focus as 
their overriding priority prior to their pregnancies as well. 
Two of the women who carried to term described themselves prior to pregnancy 
as motivated by selfish desires. Yara held a belief that she could live as she pleased and 
God would rescue her from the consequences of a lifestyle rife with poor moral choices: 
You know, that’s kind of what I grew up thinking, that eventually things were 
going to work themselves out, and that nothing permanent – I was really set that 
nothing permanently bad was going to happen to me. I wasn’t going to get 
arrested, I wasn’t going to end up with bad credit, or I wasn’t going to end up, you 
know, permanently disabled because of doing drugs, you know, or you know, my 
mind wasn’t going to get fried, or – and I certainly wasn’t going to end up 
pregnant. That’s not going to happen to me, you know. You know, God’s got my 
back. That’s not going to happen. 
Samantha described her abandonment of her family, her drug addiction and her 
lying as all a result of selfishness: 
I was untrustworthy. I was not a very nice person. I battled with a drug addiction 
to cocaine, and probably one of the main reasons was because it made me feel 
numb to anything and everything. I didn’t have to deal with my mom’s death. It 
was a scapegoat. And I stole from my dad, I stole his pain medication after the 
accident to feed my habit, to try and get more cocaine. And I lied to everyone who 
loved me, and I pushed everyone that I really knew, and knew who loved me; I 
tried to push them as far away as humanly possible. I was just not a very nice 
person unless there was something that I wanted. You know, I was out for my 
own wellbeing, and I really, I abandoned my family when they needed me the 
most. I was not – I just was not a very nice person. 
Moral Hypocrisy 
Several of the women admitted that they were more motivated to appear moral 
than to actually be moral prior to their pregnancies. Batson et al. (1999) refers to this 
motivation as moral hypocrisy. Sara Kensington, who described herself as “very 
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judgmental,” having grown up in a strict Christian school, chronicles her own progression 
into moral hypocrisy: 
And so raising them [siblings], trying to hold the family together, just feeling the 
burden of everything and the burden to be, you know, perfect and still, you know, 
not let people at school and in church and stuff know that I, what’s going on, 
because that was pretty shameful for me because I didn’t really know a lot of 
people at that time whose families were breaking up. And so I’m trying to be 
perfect at school, trying to do, maintain this Christian image that I had that 
nothing was wrong, everything was fine; didn’t really tell even my best friends 
what was going on, and so trying to manage my stress. 
Then once she and her boyfriend began having sex she described her thoughts on what 
contraception use would mean: 
And so, you know, we swore that we weren’t going to do it anymore, that that 
wasn’t going to happen, and obviously it did continue, and I felt trapped. I felt 
helpless to stop it in a lot of ways, and I also felt like if I, you know, did any kind 
of contraception or birth control, that that would have made me one of “those 
girls,” you know, who, you know, were living that lifestyle of promiscuity, and 
that by not using the, any kind of contraception, that I was saying, you know, oh 
this was just a surprise, and it’s not really the way I am, not how I live. 
Alex, who also grew up in the church, expressed her own moral hypocrisy prior to 
her pregnancy as an inability to be authentic about what was going on inside of herself: 
You know, I had no self-assurance, no self-confidence. It was inner though. It was 
inner stuff. I could fake it to anybody. I mean, I could get in front of an entire 
church and lead a youth whatever conference, and I could, you know, model or 
run, or whatever, but inside at night, you know, I was scared, I was nervous, cry a 
lot. So I remember that about myself mostly. 
Prior to pregnancy, all but two of the women (Lisa and Sara) depicted their 
lifestyles as inconsistent with their moral convictions with respect to sex before marriage; 
for Lisa and Sara sex before marriage was the norm. Therefore all of the women, except 
Lisa and Sara, were already trespassing their own moral convictions before they became 
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pregnant. For some, the experience of an unwanted pregnancy made it easy for them to 
continue down this path, as will be discussed in the next section. However, for others, the 
unwanted pregnancy was the impetus for a palpable moral reversal.  
 
Moral Self-Identity as Impacted by Unwanted Pregnancy  
Haste and Locke (1983) identify a “triggering event” as some incident that creates 
a powerful emotional response causing one to reexamine life’s choices, moral perspective 
and sense of social responsibility. An unwanted pregnancy was such an event in the lives 
of the women interviewed for this study. Yara, for example, expressed such a thought 
when she said of her unwanted pregnancy, “I think, the way that I always describe it, is 
sometimes you have to hit bottom before you look up, and that was my bottom.” 
However, upon reflection, the women recognized the pregnancy did not always trigger 
what they considered movement in a positive moral direction. The following sub-themes 
became evident as the women described themselves as impacted by the dilemma of an 
unwanted pregnancy: 
1. Decreased Moral Agency 
2. Increased Moral Responsibility 
3. The Lure of Moral Hypocrisy 
Decreased Moral Agency 
Neutralizations are what Sykes and Matza (1957) called the thoughts used to 
justify an immoral act that one is planning to commit without seeming immoral to the 
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self. All of the women in this study who aborted believed they lacked the ability to do the 
moral thing (prohibitive). This belief system helped decrease their feelings of 
responsibility toward the moral action by convincing themselves that they were not even 
given a choice in the situation. Some samples of their thinking are: “I didn’t feel like I 
had a choice,” “I can’t go through with this” [pregnancy], “ I felt trapped,” “There was 
nothing I could do,” “I didn’t have any choice,” “There’s no way I can have this baby,” “I 
didn’t have the strength to fight it,” and “That was what I had to do.” 
Four of the women who aborted described their pregnancies in terms that 
indicated they viewed themselves as victims of their pregnancies or their circumstances. 
Their sense of moral agency decreased as they thought themselves to be helpless 
casualties of life’s injustice. Sara Kensington, for example, reported that in her 
pregnancy, she felt as if she was a victim of God. She went so far as to accuse God of 
being responsible for her abortion: 
I remember being angry with the Lord that He even allowed me to get pregnant, 
knowing that I would have an abortion. I, you know, I put the responsibility – 
you, why did you let me, why did you let this happen to me? 
As a victim of the Lord’s injustice through both her pregnancy and her inevitable 
abortion that came with it, Sara Kensington convinced herself she was bereft of moral 
agency: “I didn’t feel like I had a choice.” 
Sue, who was preparing for major back surgery, already felt distraught and 
burdened. The pregnancy was perceived as one more blow to someone who was already 
down: 
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I mean, it was – I was really scared about this surgery I was having. I was really 
afraid. I mean, there was a high, a fairly good probability I could be paralyzed, 
and I knew I’d have a year of recovery, I’d have to leave my job. I was just really 
going through a lot, and I was scared. And then when this, you know, when I 
thought I was pregnant on top of it, it was like oh my gosh, I can’t take any more. 
Her guilt from the pregnancy and all the x-rays she had while pregnant seemed to render 
her incapable of moral action: 
I was just like – I just, at that point I had it in my head that this is what I had to do 
because I had destroyed this baby and I couldn’t take care of it even if I wanted to 
because I’m going to need taking care of. 
Joan portrayed herself as someone who just wanted to be loved, who became the 
victim of a married man who pursued her and got her pregnant, but ultimately didn’t want 
her. Scorned, rejected, and feeling powerless, she developed the belief that she must 
decide which of her children she would have to sacrifice: 
Let’s get back into reality now. I’m pregnant, I’m a single mom, and if I carry this 
baby to term and have it, I will ruin the complete relationship, if any, that I have 
with my two daughters. I will have nothing. So which do I sacrifice?” It became 
that to me…  And I thought, how could God ever love me?   
And as Joan chose to save her relationship with her other children by moving toward 
what was, in her mind, an inevitable abortion, she described her sense of inability to 
endure a child out of wedlock: 
I looked at my youngest daughter (STARTS CRYING) and I was like – I looked 
at the children that I had and I said (SOBBING) they’re all I had that I was – my 
gifts that the Lord gave me, and I thought will I lose them too, because I didn’t 
know Jesus enough to have the rock, to know that I could do this. That having a 
child out of wedlock regardless, even if you – and I – and everything I believed 
in, you know, pro-life, everything I believed in, I was going to go against. I was 
going to go against. 
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Increased Moral Responsibility 
All eight women who carried reported that their pregnancies caused them to 
develop an increased sense of responsibility. Most described considerations for what 
would be in the best interests of their child. Although their conclusions as to what was 
best for their children varied, their commitment to them did not. Four of the women who 
carried described the pregnancy as a major positive turning point in their lives. They 
described having no respect or concern for themselves, but the responsibility of caring for 
an innocent one brought about a radical transformation. Yara and Samantha had similar 
stories of completely eliminating their drug, alcohol, and cigarette abuse when they found 
out they were pregnant. They did for their children what they were unwilling to do for 
themselves. Samantha’s transformation was drastic: 
Before where I didn’t feel like I had a reason to live, I tried several times to take 
my own life, I finally felt like I had a purpose to live for. That it was no longer for 
myself, that I had a responsibility, and it was time for me to step up and take care 
of that responsibility. The day that I found out that I was pregnant was the day 
that I stopped smoking cigarettes, doing cocaine, smoking marijuana, stopped 
drinking. 
Nancy and Samantha, who chose families to adopt their children, felt a great 
responsibility to give to their children what they had been given: a stable loving family 
with a father and a mother. Elizabeth, who gave up her opportunity to join the Marine 
Corps, was the only woman who married the father of her baby upon the discovery of the 
pregnancy. Her decision to marry the baby’s father came directly from her sense of 
responsibility to her child: 
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I mean, it was okay, I have made this decision and this baby is innocent. This 
baby did not ask for this, and I mean, I felt like this baby was going to deserve to 
have both parents. I didn’t want the whole split-up scenario that rides so rampant 
right now, and damage – I mean, it’s damaging on children, and I, I mean, you, 
it’s obvious, you know that, and so I was like I didn’t want to add to the statistics 
there, and I think just realizing this baby was innocent. You know, they didn’t ask 
for this. We made the decision, and now we have to step up to the responsibility, 
is where I was at. So it was, I guess, loving the baby before I knew the baby. 
Sara, a single mother who barely made minimum wage, hadn’t grown up with 
much love. She found in her pregnancy an opportunity to give her child something she 
lacked: 
Like about here I had somebody to take care of and, you know, I just felt like I 
could do this. I kind of, even though I was scared and alone, and lonely for 
myself, I just felt like I could be a mom if I was given the opportunities, you 
know. But I really didn’t think that – as far as like providing, yeah, maybe 
somebody could have provided, you know, things better, but I just felt like 
nobody could love my kids better than me. 
Similarly, Lisa, who was barely scraping by financially as well, determined to 
give the same to her second child as she had the first. Motivated by her own father’s 
devastatingly cruel favoritism of her sister, Lisa said: 
I had my first one, I did the best I could do, you know. I’ll have this one, but no 
more. And that’s one of the reasons for my decisions, and I always said if I had 
children, never would I – you know, if I can’t do for both of them, neither one of 
them would get anything. 
Yara and Joy, who ultimately parented their sons, described similar feelings of 
connection and responsibility for the long-term care of their children upon learning of 
their pregnancies. 
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The Lure of Moral Hypocrisy 
Although Gilligan (1977) considered all decisions concerning the dilemma of an 
unwanted pregnancy to be a part of the moral domain, the moral element is even more 
pronounced for pro-life women faced with an unwanted pregnancy. This is especially 
true for those who are part of a church that considers extramarital sex to be sinful. Six of 
the women who chose abortion recognized that their desire to appear moral outweighed 
their desire to be moral. 
Sara Kensington articulated her own moral hypocrisy in very succinct and 
descriptive terms: 
I was most fearful of judgment on the part of everyone in my life. Parents, friends, 
you know, church, people that I didn’t even know. You know, I was just afraid of 
this idea about me that no, people would know that I wasn’t who I made myself 
out to be, and that I was working so hard to hold up this image and this mask, and 
that that would reveal me. 
Joan used religious terms to describe her thoughts about ending the pregnancy to 
continue the appearance to her church, her family, and perhaps herself that she was still 
acceptable: 
I don’t know if I thought it was going to be freedom, or that nobody would know 
that I was bad, ugly, sinful, dirty woman, you nasty person, you – you know, look 
at you. You loser. So, you know, and I, you know, my family was beginning a 
little bit to come around. I had made it. I had proven that I could get a four year 
degree, and my girls went to church, and I served the Lord, and I wasn’t dirty that 
my husband, my first husband wasn’t with me. That I wasn’t a sinner.   
The rest of the women who chose to abort similarly described their own moral 
hypocrisy: Hillary acknowledged that she fooled herself into thinking she could solve her 
problem by making yet one more “mistake” by having an abortion; Sue described her 
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goal in deciding what to do about the pregnancy as one of taking responsibility for her 
mistakes by “correcting them” through abortion; Marie described the shame she would 
feel in telling her parents that she was pregnant as her main reason for considering 
abortion; and Jacky believed an abortion would, “Just fix it and it’s over,” so they could 
return to “our fun party life, and nobody gets hurt.” 
Three of the women who carried described a strong pull toward abortion as a 
means of covering up their sex outside of marriage, but were able to overcome the 
temptation for a variety of reasons. Yara, for example, was able to recall the specific 
mental struggle she had about abortion and her desire to not be a hypocrite: 
But I wasn’t really judgmental where if somebody believed in pro-choice, I didn’t 
fault them for that, and I didn’t judge them for that, but the rationale that went on 
in my mind was, well if you’re pro-choice and you do something like that, it’s one 
thing, but if you’re pro-life and you make a choice, and you then, you know, 
consciously pro-life all of your life and then you go and have an abortion anyway, 
that’s ten times worse. That was kind of the mentality that went on in my, the 
struggle that went on in my brain. You know, well if you’re going to do that, and 
you’ve always believed this one way, that makes you a total hypocrite, and I just, 
I couldn’t bring myself to do that. 
Kay remembers the temptation to abort came briefly the one time her ex-fiancé 
mentioned it. She acknowledged only a moment of considering abortion so that she 
would not have to face her own mother who was always very critical of girls who had 
pregnancies out-of-wedlock: 
I did even think about the abortion when [her ex-fiancé] mentioned it. That was 
kind of the, oh well I could hide everything if I did that, you know. I don’t need 
anybody’s permission or whatever. No one would have to know but me and him. 
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But when queried about how she responded to him, she replied simply, “I just said I 
wasn’t, I couldn’t do that. I wasn’t going to do it.” 
Elizabeth recognized the temptation to accept the Marine recruiter’s suggestion 
that she abort, but did not allow herself to consider it. To do so would mean, “I was 
trying to cover up my wrong with more wrong. That, in my mind, was detest… like 
disgusting.” Similarly, Nancy already felt so much pain because she had betrayed her 
own standards about sex before marriage that the idea of violating more of her standards 
through abortion was too painful to consider seriously as an option. 
Summary 
The stories of the women interviewed for this study indicated that their unwanted 
pregnancies did have a substantial effect on their moral self-identities. The sub-themes 
that described the changes they experienced included a decreased sense of moral agency, 
sometimes through victimhood; an increased sense of moral responsibility because they 
saw themselves as protectors; and an increased pull to look more moral than they actually 
were. Each of these sub-themes appears to have played a substantial role in propelling 
them toward their ultimate decisions.  
 
Moral Self-Identity’s Influence on the Pregnancy Decision 
All of the pro-life women who were interviewed for this study had to make a 
decision. Some did so with a great deal of mental and emotional wrangling. For example, 
Sara Kensington described arguing with God over the abortion, devaluing the fetus by 
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calling it “cells” and working very hard to come to a place where she could abort, “And 
so I had to find some way to separate myself from what I knew was right to be able to 
make that choice, because I’d even like protested that clinic when I was little.” 
Others did what they wanted without allowing themselves to think about what 
they were doing. Alex, for example, was in such denial that when her Grandmother sat 
her down to talk to her after learning of Alex’s pregnancy, she replied “I don’t know 
what you’re talking about.” 
Regardless of their decisions or how the decisions were made, each based her 
decision on what mattered the most to her at the time. The sub-themes depicting moral 
self-identity that were heard in the stories of how the women made their decisions were: 
1. Protection of self interests through immorality 
2. Protection of self interests through morality 
3. Connection with a higher purpose 
4. Disconnection from a higher purpose 
5. Dissonance emotions 
6. Inner harmony emotions 
Protection of Self-Interest through Immorality 
Each of the women who aborted was asked to look introspectively and describe 
how she made her ultimate decision to abort; what meant the most to her in making the 
decision. Upon self-analysis, each of the eight women, without exception, reported or 
described protection of self interests as the overriding factor that permitted her to ignore 
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her own moral beliefs about abortion and do what she really wanted to do, which was to 
stop the pregnancy. Several of the women were able to articulate this finding with clarity. 
Sara Kensington remembered the thoughts which helped her overcome her own 
condemnation: 
I remember just thinking over and over again, I want my career, I want my 
education, I want my white wedding on my time. You know, I want my dream 
wedding, and I don’t want it to be a shotgun wedding, and I don’t want to have a 
big belly in my dress, and, you know, all these things, and I don’t want to have to 
marry this guy if I don’t want to, and I’m not sure that I want to. So that was kind 
of like a little stream of consciousness thought. 
And later she described, clearly that she felt her self-interests were in direct conflict with 
her own sense of morality. “I knew that what I was doing was wrong, but I wanted my 
way more than right. My way was more important to me than the right way.” 
Likewise, Marie described her self-interests as being in direct conflict with her 
morality, which she linked to what her Lord would want her to do. She very succinctly 
expressed her primary motivation behind her decision to abort: 
Selfish. Wanting to – I mean, thinking about it back then it was an inconvenience, 
definitely, to my life and I just thought there’s no way I can be a mom. I’m so 
screwed up. I knew how screwed up I was, but I couldn’t see a way out of that, 
and…and I just, I was so ashamed of even thinking about it, because I knew what 
the Lord said about it. I knew that it was murder, but I did it anyway. 
Jacky recognized the self-protective motivations behind her decision to get an 
abortion as the solution to her problem. Additionally, she acknowledged that she did not 
seek advice from someone who might give advice in conflict with those self-interests: 
So I guess, again, so selfish, so very selfish, that it was about me. You know it 
was just about, again, the solution to the problem, and it was just pretty much that 
 85
cut and dried and simple, and I certainly didn’t consider do I need to go talk to a 
preacher, or a pastor, or a priest, or a – you know, I didn’t bring in any of those.   
 Likewise, the other women who aborted expressed similar self-protective 
motivations behind their decisions. Hillary, Lucy and Joan each reported using their own 
pain as a single parent as well as the pain of their children as motivation to abort. But 
each of these ladies emphasized this was a rationalization they used to fulfill their selfish 
desire to end their pregnancies. Sue and Alex each allowed others to make the decision 
for them as a way of minimizing their own accountability in their own minds for the 
decision that they admitted they selfishly wanted to do anyway. Sue didn’t want the 
responsibility of caring for a potentially deformed baby, and Alex didn’t want others to 
know of the pregnancy.  
Protection of Self-Interest through Morality 
Although the women who carried had markedly different outcomes to their 
stories, just like those who aborted, they spoke of protection of self-interests in their 
decisions to parent or to put their child up for adoption. However, the difference appeared 
to be what they believed was in their self-interests. Their responses indicated that for 
them, following the moral path was protecting their self-interests.  
Despite myriad voices telling her to abort, and offering her the money to do so, 
Yara clearly articulated how she could not make that decision because it would damage 
her ability to live with herself. The anticipated negative self-betrayal emotion of guilt 
helped her to make a decision she could live with: 
I wanted – I mean, I think – I needed to make a decision that I could live with, 
and I knew I couldn’t live with an abortion. I knew. I am a very guilt ridden 
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person. I carry guilt with me on a daily basis, and I knew that I could not carry 
that with me. I couldn’t do that. 
Sara described similar feelings about the prospect of having an abortion when she said, “I 
just couldn’t live with myself.” Samantha sought out a solution that would give her 
positive moral emotions and was able to find that only in the idea of adoption, although 
she knew it would also give her great personal pain: “I didn’t have a peace with anything 
else.”   
Likewise, Joy spoke in adamant terms about her protection of self-interests when 
discussing why she never allowed the thought of abortion or adoption to enter her mind: 
I’m not kidding when I say abortion would’ve destroyed me…I’m in touch with 
myself enough to know, you know, what I can and can’t do. Just what I’m – I’m 
not strong enough to give a baby up for adoption, or to release a baby for 
adoption, but I’m very pro-adoption, and my husband and I have planned on 
adopting more children. And abortion was just never an option because I could 
not possibly do it. 
Nancy was the only one who drew on her spirituality to describe her moral 
decision making. She describes sitting in an abortion clinic parking lot and coming to the 
conclusion, “I can’t do this, you know. I was like, you know, I’ve got to trust God for 
strength and, you know, chose another option, because I can’t do this.” And when asked 
why she felt that she couldn’t do it, she responded in a way that showed how deeply her 
identity was enmeshed with her God and her belief that his direction was what was best 
for her. So much so, that she links her personal pain in her pregnancy to stepping outside 
of his guidance: 
Because I knew that it would cause more pain than I was already experiencing at 
that time. I knew that the sin that I had committed, this was the—I don’t want to 
say consequence—but it was, in a way, and then I thought okay, if this is the 
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consequence and the pain I’m feeling right now because of that sin, if I go and 
commit this other sin, it’s even greater in my mind, you know, then there’s going 
to be a whole lot more pain to go along with it. 
The remaining women who carried all used equally adamant responses to the question of 
why they did not abort. They refused to allow themselves to consider abortion as an 
option that could be in their self-interests. For example, Samantha said “That’s just not a 
thought that I even…entertained”; Kay stated, “I just didn’t consider the abortion thing;” 
and Elizabeth, asserted, “I can’t say it was even an option.” Lisa, in her simple response, 
indicated that for her, moral beliefs equate to moral action: “I just don’t believe in that.” 
The responses of the women to questions about what ultimately impacted their 
decision to abort or to carry revealed moral self-identity was at the heart of their 
decisions. Those who believed that their self-interests were best protected by suspending 
or ignoring their own moral beliefs for this one decision - what to do with an unwanted 
pregnancy - acted immorally. All the women who aborted, without exception, believe 
today unequivocally, that their abortions were wrong. For the women who carried, they 
believed that doing so was protective of their ultimate self-interests as well, even if it 
meant sacrificing their own plans and dreams. Each of the women who carried believes 
today that it was the right thing to do. The decisions seemed to hinge on their connection 
with or disconnection from some higher purpose served by their pregnancies, as well. 
Connection with a Higher Purpose 
The self-described moral path for the pro-life women in this study was clearly the 
path of inconvenience, embarrassment and delayed dreams. Therefore, not surprisingly, 
those who chose this path reported a connection with a higher purpose. They each 
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describe some form of a connection or identification with some principle or being that 
transcended themselves.  
All of the women who carried described their adherence to their own moral values 
as fulfilling a higher purpose. For Yara, Samantha, Sara, Lisa and Kay, the ability to give 
life rather than take it served a higher purpose and prevented them from catering to their 
desires and fears. Samantha’s account shows how her role as the protector of the life of 
her unborn child added meaning and worth to her own existence: 
Before where I didn’t feel like I had a reason to live, I tried several times to take 
my own life, I finally felt like I had a purpose to live for. That it was no longer for 
myself, that I had a responsibility, and it was time for me to (LAUGHS) step up 
and take care of that responsibility. 
Sara described her pregnancy as almost a calling to the valued, protective role of 
motherhood this way: 
I actually felt – it’s kind of hard to explain, but I actually felt, I kind of felt cool, 
you know, like, you know, like I felt more important. Like about here I had 
somebody to take care of and, you know, I just felt like I could do this. I kind of, 
even though I was scared and alone, and lonely for myself, I just felt like I could 
be a mom if I was given the opportunities, you know. 
Nancy, Joy, and Elizabeth linked their moral values to a personal God whom they 
pictured as knowing what was best for them and providing strength to act in accordance 
with what was right. Nancy elicited her God’s help to stick to her moral convictions: 
 I actually drove to one [abortion clinic] and it was, the parking lot was empty. It 
looked so just evil. (LAUGHS) It just looked so broken down and unattractive, 
and at that point I sat in the car and I started crying, and I was like, I can’t do this, 
you know. I was like, you know, I’ve got to trust God for strength and, you know, 
choose another option, because I can’t do this. 
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Despite her fears, Joy was able to find happiness in her pregnancy because she 
believed it was part of a higher purpose and leaned on her God’s strength to sustain her 
through it: 
You know, I was definitely shocked and, you know, scared, but I was also happy 
because I figured, you know, there was a purpose…It brought me back to my 
religious roots. I got a lot closer to God really quick, because I was praying like 
every day, all day long, you know, for the baby and for, you know, help me figure 
this out, help me get through this. 
Elizabeth’s description of her motivation to parent her child included an 
understanding that the life she carried mattered to her Lord.  
Pleasing the Lord, because I mean, I knew that I had, you know, made some 
wrong choices, and so I think that was my biggest thing was just pleasing Him, 
and knowing now I have this life that He’s entrusting to me, and how am I going 
to respond, how am I going to handle it. And, you know, I definitely was wanting 
to raise this baby in the ways of Him, and to grow to know Him, and so, you 
know, I really had to buckle down, and it was no longer just me. 
These women describe their connection with a higher purpose as being important to them 
and giving them the strength they needed to follow their moral convictions. Similarly, the 
women who aborted often described a disconnection from any form of a higher purpose. 
Disconnection from a Higher Purpose 
Six of the eight women described some form of disconnection from a higher 
purpose as contributing to their abortion decision. The other two, Lucy and Alex, 
reported shutting down their thoughts and emotions to prevent any connection with their 
own belief system. Hillary depicts her disconnection from God as directly related to her 
“terrible” choices: 
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Like my walk of faith with God was – I always depended on myself, and I never 
depended on Him. Never. Never depended on Him. And I just couldn’t see that 
the choices that I made depended on myself, how terrible, how you know, how 
bad things were. 
And later, she laments that had she listened to God, it would have been better for her, 
“You know I wish I could make it right. The only way I could have made it right is if I 
would have listened to God and done the right thing.” Likewise, Marie, Sue, and Sara 
Kensington described their purposeful focus on the difficulty of their circumstances and 
their disconnection with God as contributing to their ability to choose a path that seemed 
beneficial to them at the time. Sue also described her abortion as a missed opportunity to 
serve the higher purpose of protecting her child, “Well, if someone broke into your house 
and was going to either kill you or your baby, you would defend your child…but for me, 
I took the easy way out.”   
 Jacky associated her morality with her family and, specifically her grandmother. 
She remembered feeling the need to hide her decision from that grandmother who had 
Christian beliefs. Her grandmother’s morality conflicted with what Jacky thought was in 
her self-interest: 
At that point I do remember thinking, what would grandma – again, grandma was 
my poster of, you know, Christian, churchgoing. I remember thinking how 
disappointed grandma would be. She could never know about this. This would be 
so disappointing to her. And I remember thinking, it is disappointing, but it’s what 
I have to do, you know. 
The question of whether the women made connections with a higher purpose or were at a 
point of disconnection appeared to play an important role in their emotions following 
their decisions as well. 
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Dissonance Emotions 
According to Blasi (1999), it is wise for the researcher to investigate the 
emotional responses surrounding a moral decision as indicators of whether personal 
moral convictions have been violated. Embracing this suggestion, the researcher probed 
the feelings of the women following their decisions to explore how deeply they held their 
pro-life views. Festinger (1957) termed the emotions that follow inconsistency between 
thought and action as dissonance. The dissonance emotions of the women who aborted 
were especially prominent and pervasive throughout their interviews.   
All eight of the women who aborted experienced unrelenting, painful moral 
emotions that indicate their actions (abortion) were in conflict with their beliefs. Among 
the dissonance emotions found were guilt, shame, regret, deep sorrow, and hopelessness. 
Alex, Marie and Jacky each spoke of no desire to live. Marie and Jacky used illicit drugs 
to diminish the pain and were bent on self-destruction. Alex, a nursing student, tried to 
take her own life: 
And I just remember being in perpetual motion forward. I don’t – I mean, I did 
nothing. I went to school, and I ate, and I ran, and several times went to try to kill 
myself. I drove out to this lake and I stole a bottle of insulin from the hospital, and 
I knew that if I would inject the entire bottle of insulin, that I would go to sleep 
and I’d die, and I wouldn’t be in pain. And my only fear of dying was being in 
pain. I didn’t even have a healthy fear of the Lord at that time, or like that that 
was a sin. I just wanted the pain to go away. I wanted the emotion to go away, I 
wanted to stop thinking about it. 
Sara Kensington and Jacky also described an obsession with babies as a result of 
their regret. Sara K. described her fixation this way: 
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I was obsessed with babies. I mean, anywhere I went, everywhere I saw – I mean, 
it was all I could see was babies everywhere. And my friend had a baby that 
would have been maybe four months older than mine, and I mean, I just couldn’t 
get enough of him. It was like I was just so attached to him, and very depressed. 
Not realizing, not connecting that at the time, but just in a deep sorrow. 
Three of the women, when discussing what they would say now to someone in an 
unwanted pregnancy, warned of never being able to forgive oneself for having chosen to 
abort. The intense feelings of shame are evident in Hillary’s words as she imagined 
herself talking to a young lady considering abortion: 
When you think about how you’re going to feel if you make that decision, and not 
keep your child, then you’re going to, you’re never going to escape how you’re 
going to feel about that. You won’t. It will – others may see you as a good person, 
but it’s never going to be how you see yourself. You’re never going to feel that 
way, and it’s – you think you can go on and you can kid yourself, but you don’t. 
It’s just always there, and it’s always, you know (SNIFFS), reminding you that 
you were weak and you just gave in to your weakness. 
All of the women who aborted described emotions of guilt and deep sorrow. As 
Sue, for example, relayed an actual conversation she recently had with a woman in an 
unwanted pregnancy, she provided a glimpse into the emotional devastation of her own 
abortion: 
I took the easy way out. And I had a lot of guilt associated with it for years and 
years, so. I just, I was definitely very depressed for a long time, and you sort of 
stuff it. I stuffed it. I kept stuffing it down. Not a healthy thing to do. Seventeen 
years later it all came flying out…You will never forgive yourself. It will eat you. 
It will just ruin your life. 
Jacky very poignantly described how the progression of her decisions made her 
feel about herself: 
The respect level went way down. Even more so. Again, because I was the good 
girl, I was the one who held out. Then I was the one who didn’t hold out. Then I 
was the one who got pregnant. Now I’m the one who’s murdered my child. So 
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yeah, the self respect was gone. Gone, gone. Then there was no worth or – it 
doesn’t, it just so didn’t matter, it didn’t matter. Drugs didn’t matter. Guys, it 
didn’t matter. Live or die, it really didn’t matter. I mean, it just didn’t matter. 
There was zero worth. It was gone.   
The dissonance emotions described by the women who aborted were palpable even 
today, depicting the self-betrayal of their actions. On the other hand, the emotions of the 
women who carried their pregnancies to term were notably different. 
Inner Harmony Emotions 
In keeping with Festinger’s (1957) Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, those 
individuals who are able to exhibit consistency between thought and action will 
experience consonance or inner harmony emotions. The women who gave their sons for 
adoption, Nancy and Samantha, both described intense pain in relinquishing their 
children to the adoptive parents. For example, Samantha described the pain of 
relinquishing her son as, “Just a guttural…like I could not control this pain that I was 
feeling.” However, later on they spoke of the peace that inner harmony brings. Nancy 
said “I can now see my son where he’s at, and I just have incredible peace. I don’t have 
regret; I don’t have envious feelings.” Samantha relayed similar feelings, “Best decision 
of my life. I’m proud of the decision I made.” 
While some described feelings of regret about becoming pregnant outside of 
marriage, all of the women who carried and parented said they would do the same thing 
again if they found themselves in an unwanted pregnancy, indicating feelings of inner 
harmony about their decisions. Yara described her emotions after her decision as “relief.” 
Likewise, Elizabeth described similar emotions, “We both felt like we were making the 
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right choice, so there was satisfaction in that, and once we were married, I think there 
was more relief on my part that this is the direction we’re going in.” She experienced 
these emotions despite the fact that she had to give up her dream of entering the Marine 
Corps. Lisa, in her concise and winsome manner, described the inner harmony that her 
decisions have brought her as, “I feel good about myself. I think I’ve, me myself, I think 
I’ve done pretty well.” 
 
Summary 
The findings of this study have been presented in this chapter. First, sketches of 
each of the 16 women who took part in the study were given. Then each of the three main 
themes and the 13 sub-themes found in each were presented. The question of how women 
described their self-identities prior to their pregnancies was addressed first. In such, 
moral disillusionment and apathy sub-themes were much more prevalent in those who 
aborted than in those who carried. Likewise, moral clarity was a more prominent sub-
theme heard in the stories of those who later carried. Self focused motivations, including 
moral hypocrisy, were prioritized over morality in the women who carried and aborted 
alike. However these sub-themes were more prominent in the narratives of the women 
who later aborted. 
Findings which explored how the women’s moral self-identities changed as a 
result of their unwanted pregnancy were presented next. Some of the women experienced 
a decrease in their sense of moral agency through seeing themselves as a victims. Each of 
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the women who aborted described feeling incapable of carrying her child to term. Those 
who carried reported increases in moral responsibility because they saw themselves as an 
agent of protection for their unborn child. The lure toward moral hypocrisy appeared to 
increase during unwanted pregnancies in most of the women, but those who carried 
described how they were able to rise above it. 
The most definitive differences between the group of women who aborted and 
those who carried were found during the exploration into how moral self-identity 
impacted their ultimate decision. Without exception, all of the women described 
protection of self-interests as a motivating factor. The women who aborted described the 
belief that their self-interests were best served through their decision to override their 
own moral convictions, ensuring protection of pragmatic interests at the expense of moral 
ones. Conversely, the women who carried described their beliefs that their self-interests 
would be ultimately protected by the decision to carry. Another sub-theme that arose was 
the propensity of those who carried to link their pregnancies to a higher purpose and 
those who aborted to point out their disconnection from any sense of being a part of a 
higher purpose. Finally, the moral emotions experienced by the women following their 
decisions were portrayed by their self-descriptions. The two sub-themes, dissonance and 
inner harmony lent credence to the depth of their pro-life convictions, especially for those 
who aborted. 
The focus of this chapter has been to highlight the findings as they were gleaned 
from the experiences of the women who found themselves in unwanted pregnancies. The 
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sub-themes were self-emerging in the women’s narratives. The next chapter will present 
an analysis of the findings in light of the literature, a model to structure the analysis of the 
findings as they relate to and extend the literature, and recommendations for areas of 
future research. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION 
Overview 
Jacky’s words from the previous chapter sum up the findings of this research 
study in one pithy line, “It was all about me.” This was the surprising discovery for both 
those who carried and those who aborted, alike. At the heart of the pro-life woman’s 
moral decision in an unwanted pregnancy was protection of self-interests. No new levels 
of Nirvana and no ascension to an altered state of nobility where the self does not matter 
were found in the narratives of the women who carried. The findings of this study 
diminished the likelihood that such an altered state of nobility exists; however, these 
findings also demonstrated that such a state is not necessary for the translation of moral 
beliefs into action. Those who honored their moral convictions by carrying their 
pregnancies to term appeared to hold the simple belief that doing so would ultimately be 
advantageous for themselves as well. 
Thus the encouraging piece in the findings is that the capacity to exhibit moral 
integrity in one’s life resides in regular human beings. Additionally, the findings revealed 
a connection with a higher purpose was an essential element to elevating the women’s 
motives above merely survival instinct. The ensuing discussion will integrate these and 
other findings of this study with the literature to gain insight into how one experiences a 
moral dilemma and maneuvers through the decision process to choose between routes 
leading to moral integrity, or  to personal akrasia. 
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First, the discussion will explore the juncture of the findings and the literature as 
they contribute to how one perceives oneself in a moral dilemma. Second, the focus will 
turn to the self in the experience of the juncture between an immoral and a moral action. 
Next, the connection to a higher purpose and the effect of that connection on the self-
identity will be considered. These findings and analyses will then be summarized into the 
researcher’s synthesis of the experience of the self in a moral dilemma, presented here as 
the Moral Juncture Model of Self. The model will be discussed in light of Blasi’s, 
Kohlberg’s and other researcher’ contributions to the understanding of moral judgment 
and action. The possibilities for further research will be recommended in the next section 
and throughout the chapter. Then the implications of this study on education in moral 
development and in counseling will be discussed. Lastly, a summary of the chapter, 
followed by concluding thoughts on the research project will be presented. 
 
 The Perceptions of the Self in a Moral Dilemma 
In his review of the literature addressing the gap between moral reasoning and 
moral action, Blasi (1980)recognized the significance of the moral self to both the 
success and the failure to uphold one’s own moral convictions. The findings of this study 
indicated that the self was, as Blasi asserted, central to the participants’ ability to sustain 
moral integrity as well as their failure to do so. If a woman viewed herself as a victim of 
her pregnancy, her sense of moral agency decreased as well. This appeared to coincide 
with a woman’s ability to neutralize her own beliefs about abortion and to engage in 
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immoral behavior. Conversely, when a woman viewed herself as a protector of her child, 
she seemed to develop feelings of moral responsibility, as well as to anticipate feelings of 
dissonance if she aborted. The impact of viewing the self as a victim or a protector is 
discussed in this section 
Self as Victim 
The women in this study who viewed themselves as victims of their 
circumstances tended also to think of themselves with little sense of moral agency, and 
thus appeared able to neutralize more readily. Nunner-Winkler (1993) contends that 
morality is a second-order desire. This coincides with the findings in this study. When 
faced with the crisis of an unwanted pregnancy, most of the women in this study had a 
strong first order desire to end the pregnancy. The desire to act morally was secondary 
and required the ability to see their pregnancies as more than an attack on themselves. 
With this understanding, the propensity of one to think of oneself as a victim who is 
responsible for protection of one’s own basic human needs such as survival, would 
diminish the duty to think about second-order desires such as the right thing to do. 
Moreover, in viewing oneself as a victim, the sense of moral agency is diminished, and 
Bandura (2002) posits moral agency is necessary to convert moral thought into moral 
action. One could argue, however, that the lack of agency beliefs are merely 
neutralization (Sykes & Matza, 1957) or disengagement (Bandura, 2002) techniques used 
to allow the self to follow an immoral course without seeming morally wrong. 
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Using Sykes and Matza’s formulations, if a woman convinces herself that she is 
merely a victim of insurmountable circumstances with no ability to carry her pregnancy 
to term, then abortion can be pursued without taking responsibility for having made a 
decision. This denial of responsibility for her decision neutralizes the feelings of acting 
immorally. Bandura (2002) labels this kind of minimizing of one’s sense of agency and 
responsibility as a disengagement technique used to allow a person to violate one’s own 
standards and disengage one’s own self-sanctions. These women’s stories lend credence 
to the work of Bandura (2002) as well as that of Sykes and Matza (1957). 
The women who were able to convince themselves that they were victims of their 
circumstances were not capable of carrying a child, or were not responsible for the 
decision, were able to go through with their abortions. Like Marie, some of the women 
who aborted made their lack of moral agency a mantra to help them pursue their desired 
outcome, “All I kept thinking is I can’t have a baby.” Others, like Alex, became 
robotically and unthinkingly obedient to those telling them to abort in order to distance 
themselves from the responsibility of the decision. 
Self as Protector 
In contrast, upon learning of their pregnancies, some of the women perceived 
themselves as instant mothers, responsible for the protection and well-being of their 
children. Surprisingly, two of the women who aborted also reported such feelings. 
Consequently, both faced fierce internal battles to overcome their intense feelings of love 
and connection to their unborn children. Joan convinced herself that her abortion decision 
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was a choice between the inevitable sacrifice of either her existing children or her unborn 
child. Sara Kensington found ways to deny her victim (Sykes & Matza, 1957) or 
dehumanize her victim (Bandura, 2002), by purposefully working to override her beliefs. 
Her stance prior to pregnancy was, “I believed that life began at conception, that abortion 
took that life, that life was sacred.” However, upon becoming pregnant, she admitted, 
“We devalued it by saying it’s still just cells.”  Apparently these women were not as 
convincing to themselves as they would have liked. The powerful mother-love persisted 
even during their abortions. Joan told of asking the child for forgiveness as it was being 
extracted through the vacuum tube. Sara Kensington journaled after taking the first of her 
RU 486 pills, “I lost you, I already loved you…I’ve missed out on all of your life 
milestones.” These two women’s experiences bolster Verplanken and Holland’s (2002) 
research indicating that even if values were central to the self, the responsibility to uphold 
them was not necessarily present. This responsibility was neutralized or disengaged just 
long enough for the start of the abortion procedure or the taking of a pill.  
The other women who viewed themselves as mothers and therefore protectors, 
became responsible agents of moral action, as Blasi (1983) suggested in his Self Model 
of Moral Functioning. These women reported feeling, at some level, both responsible and 
capable of the moral action of carrying their child. The moral emotions of empathy for 
their children and pursuant responsibility to give them a stable upbringing both seem to 
have been significant motivational factors toward moral behavior. 
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Additionally, those women who anticipated that negative moral emotions such as 
guilt, shame, and sorrow would be experienced if they aborted were able to recognize this 
as self-destructive and therefore inhibitive. As Hoffman (2000) suggests, these moral 
emotions were supportive of the women’s sense of caring and justice for their children. 
However, if the women did not have a prior belief about the immorality of abortion, it is 
difficult to conceive that they would have anticipated guilt from it. The implication from 
this is that the women’s moral emotions supported their previous objective moral 
reasoning, rather than the other way around. 
The most difficult piece to glean from this section concerned with how one 
perceives of oneself in a moral dilemma is direction of causality. Does the sense that one 
is incapable of moral behavior lead to immoral behavior or does the desire for the 
rewards of immoral behavior drive neutralizing, such as minimizing one’s sense of 
agency? Do the beliefs in one’s moral agency act as a motivating factor to engage in 
moral action (Bandura, 1999), or does the powerful desire to act rightly create a sense 
that one is capable of doing so? While such questions are left for further research, it 
seems apparent that a strong desire for the rewards of immoral behavior, in conjunction 
with a lack of moral agency, is a quick path to immoral behavior. On the other hand, a 
strong desire to act morally, combined with an assurance that one is capable of such 
action, is a hopeful combination for moral behavior. 
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The Self in the Juncture between Moral and Immoral Action 
The crisis of an unwanted pregnancy in the lives of the pro-life women who 
participated in this study generated a notable priority toward protection of self-interests. 
Statements from those who decided to abort, such as Jacky who said, “It was so self 
centered, and it was self protective,” centered on self-interests, as did statements of those 
who decided to carry, such as Yara, “I needed to make a decision that I could live with.” 
However, the juncture between moral integration and akrasia (or the failure to act in 
accordance with one’s moral convictions) appears to hinge on what the women perceived 
was in their self-interests. The default position for human nature appears to be that which 
provides the most reward and the least consequence to oneself.  
 Protection of Self-Interests as Motivation 
Krebs and Denton (2005) recognized the human propensity toward “selfishness 
and self-serving biases” (p. 637) as the enemy of morality. To the contrary, the findings 
of this study indicate that even those who act morally are doing so to ultimately serve the 
self. As indicated above, the difference lies in which path is believed to serve the self. 
When morality appears to be in conflict with self-interests, the path of akrasia is chosen. 
Even if the moral structure is very firmly held at the objective level, as Bersoff (1999b) 
indicated, the move to consider oneself as the sole exception to the rule is an easy hurdle 
for some. The findings in this study supported this conclusion. All of the women held 
steadfast beliefs about the immorality of abortion prior to their unwanted pregnancies. 
However, the eight women who aborted their pregnancies clearly saw their own cases as 
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an exception to the rule because of their circumstances. In other words, while moral 
decisions are made objectively for others, they are often made relativistically for personal 
circumstances. This allows one to avoid the reality of personal akrasia or hypocrisy. 
To account for this, Nucci (2004) put forth a contextualized structuralist account 
of moral reasoning which postulates that one projects one’s own moral reasoning onto a 
situation only when recognizing that the decision is indeed in the moral realm. Nucci 
considered the context of a decision and its ability to overshadow a person’s ability to 
think and act morally to be a part of the complexity of the decision making process. 
While the findings of this study supported the latter contention, the findings also 
indicated that the women who believed their self-interests were served through abortion 
purposefully chose how to think about the situation (pragmatically as opposed to 
morally). This was apparently done so they could proceed with the abortion, while 
avoiding the inner dissonance of self-condemnation that could be an inhibitor. Similarly, 
several of the women who carried did so to protect their self-interests by preventing 
themselves from having to experience the emotional and spiritual consequences of 
abortion. This self-protective motivation heard in the narratives of those who chose to 
abort and carry, alike, harkens back to Freud’s (1930/1961) pleasure principle in which 
he described man as seeking pleasure and avoiding pain to the self. The diversity of the 
women’s beliefs concerning what would bring the most pleasure and pain was pivotal to 
their decisions.  
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Akrasia 
When choosing immoral behavior, the rewards to the self appear to be so enticing 
that the consequences to the self are often overshadowed. The rewards include 
preservation of self plans and dreams, avoidance of inconvenience, and often a 
maintained or improved impression on others. Sara Kensington demonstrated several of 
these in her mantra of the benefits of abortion, “I remember just thinking over and over 
again, I want my career, I want my education, I want my white wedding on my time. You 
know, I want my dream wedding, and I don’t want it to be a shotgun wedding…”  
The idea of moral hypocrisy, posited originally by Batson et al. (1997), fits neatly 
into this category of rewards being especially salient, particularly for a woman in an 
environment where unwed pregnancy is looked down upon. The ability to maintain the 
appearance of morality by acting immorally was very enticing and motivational to all of 
the women who aborted in this study. The opportunity to do as Sue desperately wanted, 
“To correct the mistake I’d made,” is incredibly attractive. In order to obtain the very 
enticing and desirable rewards of the abortion, the women’s own moral belief structure 
had to be impugned. In this study, the women did not do this overtly, but rather focused 
on the pragmatic reasons that moral behavior would be destructive to self-interests and 
therefore was not reasonable. This rescues the self from accusations that must come if the 
moral belief structure is acknowledged and upheld as valid. However, if the pathway of 
akrasia is chosen, after the rewards, inevitable and long-lasting consequences are 
experienced. 
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In this study, the mental gymnastics that were employed in order to shield the 
women from dissonance emotions long enough to act immorally, wore thin over time. 
The women reported loss of self respect, disconnection with a higher purpose, and 
intense dissonance emotions (Festinger, 1957) such as guilt, shame and sorrow. These 
emotions often began during and immediately after the abortion and were still present at 
the time of the interview as was evidenced by the depth of emotional pain displayed in 
their stories. 
The Path of Moral Integrity 
The path of moral integrity, surprisingly, fits neatly within Freud’s (1930/1961) 
pleasure principle as well. Moral integrity was found in this study in those who indicated 
that they believed morality would ultimately serve them and immoral action would bring 
great pain to them. Unlike those on the akrasia path of immorality who focused on the 
rewards to the exclusion of the consequences, those on the moral integrity pathway were 
painfully aware of the consequences of immoral behavior (abortion) to themselves. These 
consequences appeared excruciating and overshadowed any lure they felt toward the 
rewards of abortion. The rewards to the self as a result of moral behavior, although often 
delayed, were described as vital to the self. These include self-respect, increased union 
with a higher purpose, and inner harmony emotions such as peace, joy, and contentment. 
These rewards appeared to be quite motivating to those on the moral pathway. But moral 
behavior has consequences to the self as well. In this study, these include the loss (or 
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delay) of goals and plans, as well as the pain of enduring an unwed pregnancy, delivery 
and beyond.        
The women in this study who aborted by discounting their own moral beliefs still 
live in the consequences of their decisions. While any reward for doing so has long 
passed away, the betrayal of both themselves and their children has been a continuous 
and deep source of pain. The dissonance emotions presented in the findings attest to this. 
In contrast, those who chose the path of moral integration by heeding their own moral 
beliefs and carrying their children, report that they live with no regrets about the decision 
to carry. The consequences for choosing this route have not been painless; however, the 
women seem to be dwelling on the rewards. In hindsight, all of the women agree that 
adherence to their own moral beliefs was or would have been best for them. 
The Proximity of Rewards/Consequences to the Self 
Blasi’s (1984) self-model addresses the significance and salience of moral values 
to the self. It speaks of the awareness and worth one places on moral values and how 
proficiently they can be activated. In this study, it became apparent that the proximity of 
the reward and consequences to the self for moral or immoral behavior was of greater 
motivational importance. It can be argued that the proximity of rewards and 
consequences determines how salient one allows one’s moral values to be in a dilemma. 
Despite the significance and salience of an objective, theoretical pro-life moral belief 
prior to an unwanted pregnancy, once the women were personally involved in the 
dilemma, the rewards and consequences of their choices became very real. Krebs and 
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Denton (2005) recognized that people in moral conflicts have a vested interest in the 
consequences of the outcomes, evoking emotions that are not present in objective 
reasoning about the dilemma. The construct of proximity of rewards and consequences 
was formulated to account for the powerful draw toward rewards and away from 
consequences heard in the participants’ stories. This construct of proximity is not so 
much physical or temporal nearness, although that can be a factor. It has more to do with 
emotional proximity to the potential outcomes. 
The most obvious example of a reward in this study was the women’s strong 
desire to not be pregnant. Each of the women felt this desire to some degree upon 
learning of her pregnancy. Abortion was the only path to this reward. Proximity speaks to 
the intensity of the desire for the reward and awareness of the consequences which are 
influenced by the legality, availability and affordability of abortion services, the 
opportunity for anonymity, the ability to neutralize effectively, the awareness of current 
and anticipated moral emotions, the support of others, and the awareness of connection 
with a higher power, for example. Each of these proximity factors moves the woman 
emotionally closer to or farther away from the enticement of the “rewards of abortion.” 
The closer she is, emotionally, to the reward of not being pregnant, the more enticing the 
draw to immoral behavior and the more mental energy it takes to overcome that lure.  
An example of rewards and consequences of competing proximity can be 
demonstrated by Nancy’s experience of sitting in the parking lot of the local abortion 
clinic. Physically, abortion was there, available and anonymous. It would provide her a 
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way to hide her moral failure from her parents and protect them from the pain she was 
enduring. It would allow her to finish her college and career uninterrupted. Each of these 
factors increased her emotional proximity to the reward of abortion as the solution. 
However, she had some powerful inhibitive factors at work as well. She was 
experiencing intense moral dissonance from having traversed her own sexual mores, 
causing her the severe emotional pain of guilt, regret and anguish. She was in close 
proximity to the emotional consequences for her first moral self-betrayal and she 
anticipated the painful moral emotions of a more grievous trespass, that of abortion. Even 
in the abortion clinic parking lot, she could not separate herself from her beliefs that her 
morals served a higher purpose and were ultimately self-protective. In the end, her 
proximity to the consequences of an abortion and to the rewards of remaining connected 
to her God prevented her from taking that route. She was very aware of the potential 
increase in emotional and spiritual pain an abortion would cause her.  
Nucci (2004) recognized that the moral psychology field needs to account for 
when individuals prioritize their moral values and when they do not. Addressing 
proximity of rewards and consequences recognizes the old adage that “we do what we 
want to do.” “What ‘really matters’” (Blasi, 2005, p.92) to an individual at a moral 
junction is determined by that individual’s awareness of the rewards and consequences 
for both the moral and the immoral choices that lie ahead. What one chooses at the moral 
junction defines what mattered the most during the moment of decision. Moral growth 
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occurs when one can look back over immoral decisions and accept this truth about 
oneself. 
This idea of proximity of rewards and consequences can be instructive as well. 
Acknowledging one’s draw toward immoral behavior that is emotionally or physically 
near allows one the opportunity to set up protective measures that distance oneself from 
those tempting rewards. Additionally, the reminders of the consequences to the self of 
immoral behavior and of the rewards for moral behavior can facilitate taking the higher 
road of moral integrity.   
   
The Self in Relation to a Higher Purpose 
In their research of moral exemplars, Colby and Damon (1992) found that select 
members of their group were determined to reach for a “purpose beyond themselves” (p. 
300). Such was the case in this study as well. Examples of higher purposes noted by 
participants in this study covered a broad spectrum. Some believed in the benefit of 
obeying God; others believed in the importance of preserving all life. Although varied in 
content, these connections to a higher purpose were heard repeatedly in the stories of 
those who carried, and were conspicuously missing by those who aborted. This section 
will explore the findings of this study in tandem with the literature on the subject, first in 
a discussion of the disconnection from a higher purpose and then a discussion of the 
philosophical necessity for the connection of morality with a higher purpose.  
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Disconnection from a Higher Purpose 
Six of eight of the women in this study who aborted evidenced a disconnection 
with a higher purpose which appeared to contribute to their willingness to take a direction 
they viewed as immoral. This disconnection ranged in severity from those who 
experienced general moral disillusionment such as Jacky, “So [I] became very apathetic 
to morals, and truth, and relationships, and holding things sacred. Everything went out 
the window;” to those for whom morality had become connected to nothing beyond 
themselves such as Hillary, “[I was] again, self reliant, thinking that what I was doing 
was right;” to those like Alex and Sara Kensington who maintained vestiges of moral 
clarity based on their relationship with God that they chose to ignore just long enough to 
abort and maintain their moral appearance. The disconnection to a sense of higher 
purpose experienced by participants of this study made it difficult for them to perceive of 
morality as anything beneficial to themselves; rather, they viewed it as nothing more than 
an unnecessary, external, untrustworthy constraint which, in this case, contradicted their 
self-interests.   
As discussed in the findings about moral disillusionment, the women in this study 
appeared to develop their morals in relation with others. These findings correspond with 
Piaget’s (1969) playground findings where he noticed from his observations of children 
that morals are developed in cooperative relationships. However, Piaget was convinced 
that heteronomy, or learning from authority figures, was not as effective as peer 
cooperative learning. The findings of this study indicate that both the quality of the 
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heteronomous relationships and the ability of the authority figures to live the morals they 
conveyed were vital. 
The women in the abortion group who were victims of moral wrongdoing by a 
parent or authority figure – Sara Kensington, Jacky, Lucy, and Marie – each experienced 
an extreme downward moral spiral. Once they recognized the moral hypocrisy in their 
authority figures’ lives, the women jettisoned the principles taught by the hypocrites. 
Why some women dismiss the morals of authority figures who harm them and some keep 
the moral values, but dismiss their teachers as flawed, are questions for further research. 
Straub (2005) contends that morality has fertile ground for growth in 
environments where man’s basic psychological needs are fulfilled. The case could be 
made that the women who felt deprived of some of these basic needs abandoned their 
idealistic desire for transcendence. Similarly, Nunner-Winkler’s (1993) assertion that 
morality is a second-order desire, rising above the basal desires for things such as 
pleasure, indicates that those who experienced first order deprivation may have 
experienced diminished motivation to reach for higher purposes. Along with the integrity 
of the authority figure who taught the morals and the capacity to think beyond basic 
needs, the stability of the higher purpose itself was significant, as well. 
Kohlberg (1981) insisted that morality be linked to a universal, philosophical 
principle. He knew relativistic arguments had been used to justify the Holocaust, and he 
held that some things (such as annihilation of an entire race) were morally wrong. He 
proposed justice as the over-arching principle that moral actions were intended to uphold. 
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Gilligan (1982) believed that she heard the voice of caring as another, equally worthwhile 
principle, which morality serves. A variety of higher purposes were heard in this study. 
Repeatedly, when the higher purpose itself on which the women had built their 
moral foundations appeared to have failed, the women were no longer able to trust that 
morality served their self-interests. Jacky’s morality constructed around her family fell 
with the demise of her family as she knew it. Joan’s morality built around a religion of 
works, which taught earthly rewards from God for obedience, crumbled over time as she 
felt unrewarded. Lucy’s dream of an Ozzie and Harriet life became dismantled with the 
demise of her second marriage. Marie’s belief in a God of love and truth collapsed when 
her Christian mother discounted the veracity of Marie’s claims of abuse by her brother. 
Samantha’s trust in a loving, compassionate God was shattered when her devoted, 
selfless Christian mother was killed in a motorcycle accident. 
A connection to a higher purpose appears to be affected by the moral integrity of 
the authority figure, the ability to think on a transcendent plane and stability of the higher 
purpose itself. Regardless of the influences which affect connection to a higher purpose, 
the lack of connection to a higher purpose experienced by the women in this study had a 
profound impact upon their views of morality and consequently their decision to abort or 
carry. 
Connection with Varied Higher Purposes 
All of the women interviewed for this study who carried their unwanted 
pregnancies to term spoke of some connection with a higher purpose as a motivating 
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factor behind their moral decisions. The findings of this study revealed several principles 
toward which the participants felt moral obligation. Those principles were quite varied 
and some were more encompassing than others. Some women believed in a deep abiding 
relationship with a personal God whose scriptures guided them. Lisa and Sara, both of 
whom later carried their pregnancies, determined that the poor treatment by their parents 
was wrong, and therefore they developed reactionary principles that were deeply 
entrenched and guided their lives. Sara never felt loved by her parents, creating in Sara an 
intense obligation to love her children. Lisa’s sister was the favorite child, so Lisa’s sense 
of duty included treating her children fairly. 
Other participants held tightly to higher purposes because it was what they were 
given. Elizabeth, Nancy and Samantha believed strongly in not merely the right to life, 
but life in a stable, intact immediate family. Elizabeth married the father of her child 
while Nancy and Samantha each chose a couple to adopt their children. In hindsight, 
Samantha spoke of God’s higher purpose in her life and in her pregnancy: 
I mean, [my son] is my gift. You know, I still love him with all of my heart, and 
he is probably the most important, the single most important thing in my life right 
now, but he was always meant for [the adoptive couple]. You know, God, as soon 
as I made the decision, you know right when I made the decision to have sex, and 
God knew what was going to happen and said, “You know what? I have this 
couple, and this is going to be the couple,” and He knew, and He had them, and I 
mean, it was just, it was perfect. I mean, they are his parents, 100% his parents. I 
got the honor of carrying Regan for nine months, but he was always meant for 
them. Always meant for them. 
The concept of a higher purpose and how motivated each woman was to remain or 
become connected to it appeared to be significant in her ability to uphold her own moral 
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standards. If she was disconnected from that sense of a higher purpose during her 
unwanted pregnancy, she was more likely to abort. A connection to, and a trust in that 
higher purpose appeared to contribute to the belief that moral action would ultimately 
serve self-interests, even if pain was a certainty on that pathway. 
Significance of Connection with a Higher Purpose 
The idea that moral action is motivated by connection to or identification with a 
higher purpose has been found in several qualitative studies (Colby & Damon, 1992; 
Oliner & Oliner, 1988). Although the motivational power of the ultimate rewards of 
religion was discounted by Krebs and Denton (2005), this study found that faith in a 
transcendent being was indeed a motivational pull toward moral behavior. Power’s 
(2005) contention that a power beyond the self could provide a needed sense of moral 
agency was indeed supported by some of the women who carried in this study. However, 
his idea that this connection could provide the means for someone to act in a “supramoral 
self” (Power, 2005, p. 237) was not supported here. Colby and Damon (1992), Oliner and 
Oliner (1988), and the findings of this study all point out that those who do morally 
courageous acts are normal and average people who perceive of themselves as nothing 
out of the ordinary. One possible reason for this could be that those who act morally feel 
they are serving their self interests through their moral actions and their connection to a 
higher purpose, as opposed to doing something incredibly selfless.  
Statements from participants, such as Lisa’s “I just couldn’t live with myself,” 
and Yara’s “I knew I couldn’t live with an abortion,” indicate that there was a point of 
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moral self-integration where they believed that morality served their self-interests. This is 
an extension to the literature concerning moral identity and the motivations to act 
morally. Those who carried their pregnancies to term, in making the choice to remain or 
become connected with a higher purpose by living within their own moral convictions, 
appeared to do so because it was in their self-interests. In so doing, they discovered a path 
of regret-free inner harmony that came with the connection to that higher purpose, despite 
the hardships of single parenting or the placement of their children for adoption. These 
findings support Blasi’s (2004) claim that one truly becomes oneself in living out one’s 
core ideals. Oliner and Oliner (1988) found that those who rescued Jews from the Nazi 
regime experienced the enduring reward inherent in the significance of their moral 
actions. Likewise, the participants in this study who chose to act with moral integrity and 
carry their children are left with the enduring reward of that decision.     
Similar to the women who carried, the women who aborted did so believing that 
they were serving self-interests. However, this study found that immoral action done in 
self-interest that requires disconnection from a higher purpose appears to be ultimately 
detrimental to the self. Unlike the women who carried and have experienced the enduring 
rewards of their choice, the women who aborted have long ago discounted any rewards 
their abortions provided them. What remained for them were the regrets and the 
dissonance emotions of guilt and sorrow. Although five of the eight women have sought 
out post-abortion counseling and believe that they are forgiven by their God, all of them 
continue to struggle with forgiving themselves. Five of those women now work for or 
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volunteer their time to pro-life counseling ministries in order to use their regrets to help 
others make better choices. They are trying to use their stories of pain and sorrow to 
serve a higher purpose: preventing others from facing a similar lifetime of regret.  
 
Moral Juncture Model of Self 
As the findings and the analysis were being assimilated, a picture of how the 
moral self-identities of the women in this study impacted their decision-making began to 
take shape. A preliminary model is presented here to structure the findings of this study 
in context with the literature and to provide a framework for future research. 
An Overview of the Model 
The complexity of a single moral decision is perplexingly complicated and 
multifaceted. Thus, a simple model might seem both presumptuous and naive. However, 
using the principle of parsimony, sometimes the simplest explanations are the most 
useful. With this principle in mind, the Moral Juncture Model of Self (Figure 1) is 
presented here as a simple explanation of the intersection of morality and the self in the 
decisions of the women in this study. The model is merely a reflection of the experiences 
of the 16 pro-life women in an unwanted pregnancy in this study, but it has potential for 
expansion to the body of moral self-identity and decision making as well. That possibility 
is a question for researchers to follow. 
The Moral Juncture Model of Self assumes that an objective moral judgment has 
previously been rendered for the moral dilemma being faced and therefore a moral 
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conviction has been formed prior to the specific dilemma addressed by the model. The 
model begins with the self in that particular moral dilemma. Factors that would impact 
the self in a moral dilemma would include one’s moral history, sense of moral agency 
(Bandura, 2002), moral emotions (Blasi, 1999; Hoffman, 2000), moral motivations 
(Batson et al., 1997; Blasi, 1999; Nunner-Winkler, 1993; Power, 2005), moral intuitions 
(Haidt 2001), desires, personality (Blasi, 1995; Oliner & Oliner, 1988), spirituality 
(Power, 2005), ability to neutralize (Bandura, 2002; Sykes & Matza, 1957), and the 
context of the dilemma (Bersoff, 1999b; Krebs & Denton, 2005; Nisan, 2004). All of 
these elements factor into and impact how one perceives the self in this specific moral 
dilemma. 
According to the findings of this study, the primary motive for the self in a moral 
dilemma is protection of self-interests. The direction one takes at this fork in the road 
constitutes a decision between moral integrity, that is, adherence with one’s own pre-
determined objective moral judgments, and akrasia, the pathway to action that conflicts 
with previous moral reasoning on the subject. All the factors mentioned above affect the 
propensity toward the higher path of moral integration or the lower path of akrasia. 
The proximity of anticipated rewards and consequences to the self for following 
the higher or the lower pathway, as introduced in a previous discussion, has the 
predilection for overriding all previous moral reasoning about this dilemma and other 
factors which have been shown to impact the moral self. The awareness of competing  
 
 119
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 120
rewards and consequences answers the question, “What matters most to me in this 
dilemma?” The answers to this question will govern which rewards and consequences are 
emotionally held close and are thus motivational. The proximity of rewards and 
consequences additionally affects the belief system about the importance of morality. 
The pivotal point of decision will come from the answer to the question, “What is 
in my self-interest?” The higher path of moral integration is motivated by the belief that 
morality ultimately serves the self. This pathway is one of trust in and connection with 
some form of higher purpose. The lower pathway begins with the belief that morality 
conflicts with self-interests. To take this pathway, connection with a higher purpose must 
be temporarily severed (or prevented from forming) and the focus must remain on 
pragmatic considerations above principled reasoning. 
If the higher path is chosen, resulting in action commensurate with moral 
convictions, the consequences to the self, such as loss of pragmatic dreams and plans 
must be endured. However, these are filtered by the ultimate rewards to the self, such as 
self-respect, inner harmony emotions (peace, contentment, satisfaction), and an increased 
sense of union with the higher purpose. If the lower default path is chosen, the pragmatic 
rewards to self, such as attainment of desires and preservation of self-plans and dreams, 
are experienced. However, these are overshadowed over time by the consequences to the 
self: loss of self-respect, disconnection with a higher purpose and intense dissonance 
emotions. In the end, the enduring legacy of the lower pathway is the lasting consequence 
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to the self; the legacy of the higher road is the enduring reward of significance beyond the 
self. 
Differences from Blasi’s Moral Model of Self Functioning 
Nucci (2004) and Nisan (2004) criticized as simplistic Blasi’s (1984) Self Model 
of Moral Functioning with its three components: the moral self, moral responsibility and 
self-consistency. They argued his model was not complex enough to describe real-world 
moral functioning. Blasi’s model is built on the understanding that as one values morality 
as part of the core identity, one will feel more responsible toward acting moral and will 
thus be motivated to act in a congruent manner where moral beliefs match moral actions. 
The complexities of understanding how temptations toward immoral behavior affect 
those in moral dilemmas are not addressed by the model. The conceptual problem that 
Nucci (2004) and Nisan (2004) appear to have concerning the application of Blasi’s 
model arises when attempting to understand the majority of real moral decisions. Blasi 
(1993) does recognize that a deeply moral person can act immorally: 
A person can be deeply moral even if he or she engages in actions that are morally 
ambiguous or outright immoral; in this case, the integration of morality and 
personality could be seen in one’s response to one’s own action, e.g., regret, guilt, 
and concrete attempts to repair the damage and reconstitute one’s values (p. 120). 
However, his model does not account for how this happens, especially if the person 
deeply values and identifies with morality, feels acutely responsible to act morally, and 
longs to act consistently on those morals. While it makes sense that when one acts 
immorally, either morality was not prioritized, or one did not feel responsible to act 
morally, or the draw to remain morally consistent wasn’t an adequate motivator, there are 
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probably better explanations for the lure toward immoral behavior. A model such as the 
Moral Juncture Model of Self (described above) is intended to extend Blasi’s (1984) Self 
Model to address the realities of decision-making in the moral realm. The temptation of 
the rewards of immoral behavior beckons even the best of moral exemplars.  
Another way that the Moral Juncture Model of Self differs from Blasi’s (1984) 
model is in the conceptualization of the moral self. The problem with the concept of the 
moral self in Blasi’s model, once again, has to do with how this applies when one does 
not prioritize morality in oneself. If one prioritizes pragmatism above morality, does this 
constitute a less-than-moral self? Because of the problems with defining and 
understanding the concept of the moral self, the model presented in this paper depicts the 
self independent of, but in relation to moral values. It is when one understands and acts 
on the belief that morality ultimately serves the self that moral integration is reached 
during that specific moral dilemma. 
The Moral Juncture Model of Self depicts a single moral dilemma, and describes 
how the decision is made for that particular dilemma. Each moral dilemma has a different 
set of factors that impact a decision. The possibility for growth in moral integrity exists as 
one chooses the path of moral integration over and over, but the possibility for failure 
exists with every moral dilemma as well. Moral behavior, according to this model is even 
more significant when it becomes consistent behavior because the possibility for failure 
always exists and continually tempts the one in the dilemma. 
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Blasi’s (1984) Self Model of Moral Functioning shows up in several places in the 
model presented here. How one perceives oneself in a moral dilemma would be affected 
by how closely one values morality and how responsible one feels to act morally. The 
desire for consistency shows up in this model in the proximity of rewards and 
consequences. If one values morality and feels responsible toward it, then the anticipation 
of dissonance emotions if one acts immorally will be emotionally near and prohibitive. 
However, the Moral Juncture Model of the Self acknowledges that the temptation for the 
reward of immoral behavior can draw emotionally closer, and thus override the fear of 
consequences for the immoral behavior.   
The Moral Juncture Model of Self clarifies the use of the word moral, as well. 
Blasi (2004) criticized the propensity in the literature for authors to confuse the word 
moral for all decisions that have “characteristics associated with moral functioning” 
(p.346), regardless of whether they are moral or immoral. This problem certainly existed 
in Gilligan’s (1982) qualitative interviews of women in an abortion dilemma. Those who 
believed they would be killing their children but aborted anyway were making “moral” 
decisions alongside the moral decisions of those who refused to do so. Neutralizations 
were analyzed as moral reasoning. Hopefully the Moral Juncture Model of Self will help 
clarify such confusion. 
Revisiting Kohlberg 
The disappointing aspect of the Moral Juncture Model of Self lies in its centering 
on the protection of self-interests. In Kohlberg’s (1981) stage and sequence model, he 
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visualized moral development as a movement away from self-interests toward principled 
reasoning. Although not specifically studied, reasoning from all of Kohlberg’s stages was 
evident in the women interviewed. Most were able to reason in a principled manner 
before they were in an unwanted pregnancy; however, upon finding themselves in the 
dilemma, they moved to an orientation of satisfying their own needs. Those who carried 
differed from those who aborted in that they believed the moral action could satisfy their 
deepest needs. The Moral Juncture Model of Self accounts for this movement by 
recognizing all personal moral decisions are made through the filter of self-interests. This 
might be a reason for the previous findings that people reason at higher stages when 
reasoning objectively than when they are in the midst of the same moral dilemma 
(Armon, 1995, 1998; Foster & Sprinthall, 1992; Krebs & Denton, 2005). This might also 
help explain why Colby and Damon (1992) found that the moral exemplars in their study 
were not all reasoning at higher principled stages.  
In accord with other researchers (Blasi, 1999; Bergman, 2002; Hoffman, 2000; 
Rest, Narvarez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999), this model embraces Kohlberg’s (1981) belief 
in the significance of the ability to reason morally and to develop toward more principled 
reasoning abilities. The model assumes that moral reasoning has led one to a belief about 
the right thing to do in the moral dilemma in which one finds oneself, or at least one has 
developed principles to guide one into knowing what would be right and wrong in the 
predicament. However, according to this model, only when a connection is made between 
objective moral reasoning and how it ultimately serves the self to become part of a higher 
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purpose, does the reasoning become personal. Since one reasons through the filter of the 
self in a moral dilemma, unless one is able to perceive how morality will ultimately serve 
the self, one is less likely to pursue the moral course of action. This model challenges the 
belief that people are capable of ascending to a level where the self-interests do not enter 
into the deliberation of a moral dilemma. 
Kohlberg’s model was formulated to understand development in objective moral 
reasoning; it was not intended to describe motivations toward moral behavior (Colby, 
2002). The Moral Juncture Model of Self was developed to address the motivations 
toward moral as well as the natural temptation toward the immoral, if it appears to serve 
the self. This model was developed by incorporating findings from the decision-making 
experiences of those who made immoral as well as moral choices, while assimilating 
research into decision-making behind morally deviant behavior as well as that of moral 
exemplars. In so doing, this model hopefully sheds light on why the same person could 
act morally in one situation and immorally in another. 
 This section of the chapter has presented a self model of moral decision-making 
as derived from the experiences of the women in this study and from the literature. A 
visual portrayal of the delineating factors that propel one to remain true to one’s moral 
convictions or that lure one to the path of akrasia has been presented. This is a simple 
attempt to describe the phenomenon of the selection of divergent paths for those with 
similar moral convictions as heard from the women in this study. Additionally, this 
section has contrasted the self model of moral decision-making with Blasi’s self model of 
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moral functioning and Kohlberg’s (1981) universal levels of development in moral 
thought. 
Additional Comparisons with the Literature 
Several of the factors affecting one’s ability to act on one’s moral convictions as 
discussed previously in the literature review were indeed present in the findings of this 
study. Moral emotions, as Eisenberg (2000) stated, appeared to indeed motivate both self-
described moral and immoral behaviors. Guilt and shame associated with the unwanted 
pregnancy at times appeared to motivate women to abort in order to eliminate the 
pregnancy causing those emotions. Conversely, the painful guilt emotions from the 
unwanted pregnancy also seemed able to motivate some to carry to term to avoid further 
guilt from an abortion. Eisenberg’s (2000) contention that non-moral emotions such as 
anger, frustration, and fear can impact moral functioning was supported by this study. 
Hoffman’s (2000) recognition of the limitations of moral emotions to guide moral 
behavior, such as the “here-and-now” bias favoring those close to oneself (in this case 
protection of one’s self-interests through abortion) appeared to be relevant to this study. 
As Hoffman asserted, it was hard to ferret out when moral emotions were motivators and 
when they were responses of those motivated to act morally.  
The idea behind the proximity of rewards in the Moral Juncture Model of Self 
takes into account how the moral emotions can cause one to emotionally move toward or 
away from a moral decision. For example, a woman may have become more emotionally 
attached to the idea of carrying her child because of empathy or a woman may have 
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moved away from the idea of carrying a child to term because of anticipated shame 
emotions associated with unwed pregnancy. The idea of moral intuitions is similarly 
addressed in the proximity of rewards. 
Haidt’s (2001) social intuitionist approach that recognizes the sudden appearance 
of moral thoughts could be explained in this model as a sudden propelling toward one 
outcome (carry or abort) driven by the close proximity to the rewards to the self or the 
consequences to the self  of that decision. The experience that some of the women 
described sounded as Haidt (2001) asserted, that they made their decision and then 
became like a lawyer, defending their decision to themselves and to others. This ability to 
defend the decision could also be called neutralization or rationalization, if the decision is 
believed by the one making it to be immoral. As Bandura (2002) asserted, the women 
who were better at using disengagement techniques such as avoiding their own thoughts, 
allowing others to make the decision, using euphemistic language and convincing 
themselves that they could not carry to term, were among those who went through with 
their initial intuitions and aborted. 
Moral motivation, as defined by Power (2005) as the desire for the morally good, 
is also evident in the Moral Juncture Model of Self’s proximity of rewards and 
consequences. The things that matter to one, and therefore are emotionally “close” in the 
moral decision-making process indicate what motivates a person. If one anticipated a 
great amount of guilt surrounding an immoral action, it is apparent that one is motivated 
by morality. If very little guilt is anticipated when planning to act immorally, one is 
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probably not overly motivated by morality. For many of the women who aborted, it was 
apparent that their pragmatic concerns for freedom, education, career, or financial 
stability were more motivational than their desire to do what they believed was the right 
thing to do. This finding squares nicely with Bersoff’s (1999b) hypothesis that when 
other life goals outweigh one’s desire to be moral, the behavior follows the motivation. 
This becomes apparent in the Juncture Model when looking at what rewards and 
consequences mattered the most thereby affecting the decision. The next section will 
address proposed praxis for the model presented in this study. 
 
Implications for Practice 
The Moral Juncture Model of Self has practical implications for moral 
development education as well as in counseling practice. For moral educators, the model 
points to the importance of understanding the higher purpose that is served by one’s 
moral convictions. As Kohlberg (1981) recognized, moral education requires an 
understanding of the reasons one ought to be moral. The Moral Juncture Model is a 
reminder to those who hope to help others develop not merely in moral thought, but in 
moral action, of the necessity to connect those morals with a higher purpose. 
Additionally, the model points to the importance of understanding how morals serve the 
self interest. The benefits of connection to a higher purpose could be purposefully and 
sincerely explored. 
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Likewise, the impact that the proximity of rewards and consequences has on one’s 
ability to make moral decisions congruent with moral convictions could be a beneficial 
concept to moral educators hoping to engage students in lively, productive, and realistic 
scenarios. As the Juncture Model depicts, the propensity to negate one’s own convictions 
when the rewards of doing so seem proximal and tangible is a temptation that could be at 
least brought to the conscious level through education. This temptation and the 
destructive nature of the consequences could then be considered consciously, rather than 
allowing the power of the subconscious to pull toward apparent rewards to self and to 
influence decisions, unchecked. 
Kohlberg’s (1971) ideas about moral education’s use of Socratic questioning may 
have spent too much time pondering dilemmas where there was no clear moral and 
immoral decision – choosing to focus on the structure of the reasoning rather than the 
outcome. The Juncture Model depicts that even when there is a clear-cut conviction, the 
choice can seem hard because of the proximal nature of the rewards of immoral behavior 
to the self. Socratic discussions of the long-term pain of a disconnection from a higher 
purpose and the painful, lasting dissonance emotions caused by akrasia may be more 
productive for moral educators.  
In counseling, the Juncture Model would indicate that Socratic questioning about 
the higher purpose the clients’ decisions may serve and the long-term value of connection 
with that higher purpose may help clients remain true to their own moral convictions. 
Additionally, questioning about the long-term consequences for the decision may help the 
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client to focus on the rewards for remaining true to their own moral convictions and aid 
the client in making a decision congruent with his or her own value system. The next 
section is provided to suggest further research to answer questions generated by this 
study. 
   
Recommendations for Research 
Similar to most research projects, this study has probably generated more 
questions than it has answered. Recommendations for further study in several areas in 
addition to those suggested earlier in this chapter will be presented here. First, further 
investigation will be proposed into the area of moral development as spawned by the 
findings of moral disillusionment. Secondly, questions that arose about the conceptual 
construct of a higher purpose as a basis for moral action will be presented as possible 
research topics. Finally, suggestions for further research into the validity of the proposed 
model will be addressed.        
Moral disillusionment was a prominent finding in this study. Just as immorality 
needs to be studied in the context of moral decision making (Joy, 1983), so does moral 
disillusionment as a potential juggernaut to moral development. As such, the prominent 
place held by relationships, both positive and negative, in moral identity formation is 
worth revisiting in-depth. The impact that the moral integrity or the moral hypocrisy 
shown by authority figures in a child’s life has on their moral development would make a 
useful study. 
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Perhaps the most significant question that arose from this study is one that has 
been bantered through the ages. Although philosophical in nature, the idea of morality, as 
Kohlberg (1981) asserted, begs the question, what is the higher purpose that morality 
serves? Is it merely whatever principles one vows to pledge? Are some higher purposes 
better than others at encouraging moral integration? If one believes that the higher 
purposes are defined by a god, does the ubiquitous nature, stability, accountability, and 
the understanding of the source of morality help one maintain moral convictions? 
Investigation into the Moral Juncture Model of Self presented in this research 
paper would be helpful. First, does the model fit the experiences of other populations in 
other moral dilemmas outside of pro-life women in unplanned pregnancies? Do repetitive 
iterations on either level of the model (moral integration or akrasia) by the same person 
predict the path that person will take in future moral dilemmas? What kind of counseling 
interventions can be implemented to increase connection with a higher purpose and 
therefore a greater proclivity toward moral integration? 
 
Summary 
In this chapter, the findings of the study were compared with the literature to 
discuss what factors impacted one’s moral self-perception. Following this assessment, a 
discussion of how that self-perception impacted the actual decision-making processes of 
the women in a moral dilemma was presented. The construct of a higher purpose, which 
was found in the interviews and the literature alike, was presented as it affected the 
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ability to act in accordance with one’s moral convictions. A synthesis of the literature and 
the findings was then presented in a visual version of the researcher’s concept of how 
they integrate into a decision-making model, called the Moral Juncture Model of Self. 
This model was then compared and contrasted with other researchers’ findings about the 
moral judgment-action relationship. Finally, implications for practice, as well as 
questions and possibilities for future research were provided. 
  
Concluding Thoughts 
Blasi (1983) is credited with being the first researcher to recognize the 
significance of self as filling the gap between moral thought and moral action. Such was 
found to be the case in this study. However, at the heart of the juncture between moral 
and immoral action was the question of what best protected self-interests. The central 
prominence that the self played in the role of moral decision-making and how the self 
would be affected by the consequences and rewards of their actions was perhaps the most 
predominant finding. Moral integrity was chosen to ultimately serve the self-interest of 
being a part of a higher purpose. Identification with a higher purpose gave meaning and 
legitimacy to the women’s moral action. Additionally moral integrity was found to be 
innately and enduringly satisfying because it met the women’s inner need for a 
connection with something higher than themselves. Ironically, the mantra of present-day 
culture to seek self-fulfillment by looking inward was, in this study, the pathway to regret 
and loss of self-respect. A representation of the analysis as interpreted by the researcher 
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was presented in a Moral Juncture Model of Self. The model, which centers on the 
protection of self-interests, was expounded upon as it integrates the self in a moral 
dilemma, the beliefs about morality, the connection with a higher purpose, and the 
proximity of rewards and consequences to self. 
Sixteen women volunteered to share the details of their lives in this study so that 
others might learn and grow from their moral successes or failures. The depths of 
emotion filling their stories with deep regret or enduring peace indicate their agreement 
with the sentiment at the end of Robert Frost’s (1920) poem, “The Road Not Taken”: 
“Two roads diverged in a wood, and I -  
I took the one less traveled by, 
And that has made all the difference.” 
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Appendix A: Interview Guide 
Title: Pro-Life Women Faced with an Unwanted Pregnancy  
Setting: Determine location that is comfortable, safe for the interviewee. Ask her to bring 
along any journals/diaries/writings concerning thoughts about and experiences during the 
unwanted pregnancy. 
1. Introduction: 
(a) Introduce self 
(b) Request permission to record – turn on recorder 
(c) Review/sign Informed Consent – highlight voluntary nature and contact 
researcher’s information 
(d) Take Demographic Questionnaire information 
(e) Provide a list of post-abortion counseling contact information/counselors in the 
local area who have agreed to accept referrals from the current study 
(f) Collect diaries or journals of timeframe to make copies 
(g) Provide information about number of questions (approx. 30 – one to two hours), 
organization of interview guide and types of questions (researcher seeks to know 
about you and your experiences with this pregnancy – questions will begin 
general and will become more specific) 
(h) Questions?  
2. Screening: 
(a) What was your age when you discovered you were pregnant? (must be 20 y/o or 
more to be included) 
 144
(b) What was your living situation?  (must have 2 years or more of financial 
independence from parents to be included) 
(c) Prior to the pregnancy, how would you have described your stance on abortion? 
[Must:(a) view the fetus as a person who is alive, (b) consider abortion as the 
taking of a life, and (c) think abortion justifiable only if the actual physical life of 
the mother is threatened by the continued pregnancy to be included] 
(d) Tell me about the circumstances surrounding your pregnancy and your feelings 
about it. (If aborted – assume unwanted; if aborted to save life of mother – will 
not be included; if carried to term –  must be unmarried and unwanted to be 
included) 
3. Demographic questionnaire(Appendix C) 
4. Tell me a little bit about yourself.   
(a) Family 
(b) Work 
(c) Daily Life 
5. If you were to describe yourself to me what would you say?  Who are you? 
(a) What things matter most to you? 
(b) Tell me how significant parts of your upbringing made you who you are today. 
6. Go back to just prior to your pregnancy and describe yourself to me. Who were you 
then? 
(a) What mattered most to you then? 
(b) What were your goals? 
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7. Tell me what it was like for you when you found out you were pregnant. 
(a) Thoughts 
(b) Emotions 
(c) What did you fear the most? 
8. Did becoming pregnant change the way you thought about yourself? 
(a) How so? 
9. What options did you consider in the pregnancy? 
(a) With whom did you consult? 
10. How did you make your decision to (abort/carry)? 
(a) What were your goals or motivation? 
(b) What mattered most to you then? 
11. Was there a right thing to do in this situation? 
(a) Tell me how responsible you felt for doing the right thing. 
(b) Tell me about your feelings as to whether you were capable to do what you 
thought was the right thing.  
12. Tell me about your emotions following your decision. 
(a) Did you feel positive/negative, conflicted/peaceful, eager/avoidant? 
(b) How did you feel about yourself in the decision? 
13. If you had it to do all over again what would you do? 
(a) Why? 
(b) What would you say to someone in an unwanted pregnancy? 
14. Did this interview change your thoughts or feelings in any way? 
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15. That is all of the questions that I have for you. Is there anything that you would like to 
ask me? 
16. Post Interview Activities: 
(a) Remind participants that they have a list of counselors in the local area who have 
agreed to accept referrals from the current study 
(b) Provide contact information and invite participants to call or e-mail with 
additional thoughts or concerns 
(c) Thank participants for time and valuable insights 
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Appendix B: Informed Consent 
Pro-Life Women Faced with an Unwanted Pregnancy 
Patti McCarthy Broderick, Doctoral Candidate 
Liberty University 
Center for Counseling and Family Studies 
  
You are invited to be a part of a research study investigating the experiences of pro-life 
women who have been faced with an unwanted pregnancy. You were selected as a 
possible participant in this study because you were identified as being pro-life, over 20 
years of age and financially independent from your parents when you discovered your 
pregnancy. Please read this form in its entirety and ask any questions you may have 
before agreeing to be in the study. 
 
This research study is being conducted by Patti McCarthy Broderick to fulfill one of her 
requirements for earning a Ph.D. in Professional Counseling from Liberty University, 
Lynchburg, Virginia. 
 
Background Information 
 
The purpose of this study is to gain insight into the actual experiences of pro-life women 
who have faced an unwanted pregnancy and to understand what factors went into their 
decisions to abort or to carry their pregnancies to term.   
 
Procedures 
 
If you agree to be a part of this study, your participation will involve a private, 
confidential interview with the researcher that will last approximately one and one-half to 
two hours. Additionally, you are encouraged to provide any journals, diaries or other 
writings that may enlighten the researcher about your beliefs about unwanted 
pregnancies, and your thoughts and feelings as you journeyed through your own 
unwanted pregnancy. No more than two follow-up interviews may be conducted that will 
last no more than one hour in order to clarify and validate information gathered during 
the first interview. All interviews will be recorded and transcribed verbatim for a more 
thorough analysis of their content.  
 
Risks and Benefits of being in the Study 
 
Psychological risks exist. Consequently, discomfort may be experienced as a result of 
participating in this study. These may include, but are not limited to (a) emotional/ 
psychological stress generated from the question content or the memories generated by 
the questioning, (b) the possibility of becoming fatigued during the interviewing process 
or as a result of the interview and the emotions generated from it, and (c) revelation of 
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personal issues of sufficient depth and meaning to cause emotional pain during and 
following the interview.   
 
Benefits of participation in this study include the opportunity to look introspectively 
through the interview questions, the chance to describe your own experience to help 
social scientists understand what it was like for you, and the opportunity  to share with 
others what you have learned from your experiences. 
 
Mental Stress 
 
Following the interview, a referral list of willing local counselors who have agreed to see 
participants of this study will be provided to you. Liberty University will not provide 
treatment or financial compensation if you become mentally stressed as a result of 
participating in this research project. This does not waive any of your legal rights nor 
release any claim you might have based on negligence. 
 
Confidentiality   
 
The information you provide during this and any subsequent interviews will be kept 
private. Transcriptions will be conducted by a professional transcriptionist who is 
ethically required to maintain confidentiality. The transcriptionist will never see the 
demographic information. Digital tapes will be maintained until the transcriptions are 
verified by the researcher, when they will be erased. 
 
All interviewees will be given fake names and any specific identifying information 
discussed during the interview will not be included in the final report to protect your 
identity. These fake names and identifying information will be seen only by the 
researcher and will be kept secure in separate locations of the researchers’ home. 
 
Upon completion of this study, the researcher will contact you to discuss the results and 
provide you with a copy, if desired. The results of this study could be published in 
professional journals, books and articles. 
 
Voluntary Nature of the Study 
 
Your participation in this study is strictly voluntary. You may withdraw from the study at 
any time. If an interview has already been conducted, your individual responses may be 
removed from the study prior to publication by contacting the researcher at the number 
provided on the following page. Should you become fatigued at any time during this 
interview, a 10-15 minute break will be taken from the interview to allow you to 
determine if you desire or are able to continue. Should issues of emotional distress or 
functional difficulty arise as a result of this interview, please contact the researcher. 
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Contacts and Questions: 
 
Please direct questions regarding your participation in this research study, participants’ 
rights or on issues relating to participation in this research study to the researcher by e-
mail at pmbroderick@liberty.edu or by calling (703) 737-7353. The Liberty University 
Institutional Review Board, an objective group of representatives from Liberty University 
who are responsible for the ethical treatment of the participants of research conducted at 
the university, may be contacted at IRB@Liberty.edu or by writing the Institutional 
Review Board, Liberty University, 1971 University Blvd., Campus North, Suite 2400U, 
Lynchburg VA 24501. If you have concerns about how you were treated by the 
researcher, please feel free to contact them. 
 
Statement of Consent 
 
By signing below, you voluntarily consent to participate in this study and acknowledge 
you understand and voluntarily agree to: (a) the potential risks to yourself and (b) the 
manner in which the information you provide this study will be gathered, stored, and 
used. Your signature is required on both identical copies of the consent forms. One copy 
is to be kept by you for your records and one will be retained by the researcher for the 
research records. 
 
Participant Signature_____________________________________________ 
Printed Name___________________________________________________ 
Date__________________________________________________________ 
 
Researcher Signature_____________________________________________ 
Printed Name___________________________________________________ 
Date___________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix C: Demographic Questionnaire 
Your Name______________________________(first name only) 
State of Residence ______________________   
How can I contact you? 
Phone Number_______________   Can I use this?_____ (yes/no) 
E-mail______________________  Can I use this?_____ (yes/no) 
I will wait for you to contact me only______ (please do!) 
Information about you now: 
 Age:_____ 
 Race:_________________________ 
 Religion:______________________ 
 Marital Status:_______________________ 
 Occupation:____________________ 
 Education Level Attained:___________________________ 
 Number of Children:_____ 
 Total Number of Previous Pregnancies:_____  
 Total Number Aborted:_____ 
 Total Number Delivered:_____ 
Total Number Miscarried:_____ 
 
